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ABSTRACT
The recent spate of cases in which reporters have been
subpoenaed, fined, jailed, or otherwise disciplined has laid bare the
divisions among the courts over the existence and scope of the
“reporter’s privilege.” The cases have also exposed the doctrinal,
historical, and theoretical infirmities of the broader law of
newsgathering, which encompasses not only source relationships,
but also rights of access to places and records, protections against
civil and criminal liability for torts and crimes committed in the
pursuit of news, and protections against government searches of
newsrooms and phone records, among other things. Resolving these
conflicts has grown more urgent with the democratization of media
and the emergence of bloggers and other news providers who have
challenged traditional conceptions of “journalists” and “the press.”
To settle these controversies, this Article seeks to move past the
courts’ desultory analyses, focus on core principles, and situate those
assessments in the context of a particular approach to constitutional
interpretation. This Article proposes a “sequential” interpretation of
the First Amendment—an approach that assesses, in turn, the text of
the Amendment, its history, its place in the broader constitutional
structure, and its contemporary meaning in light of substantial social
change. This approach draws upon conventional interpretive
frameworks to show that there is abundant constitutional support to
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recognize most aspects of the right to gather news, including the
reporter’s privilege, and that doing so does not require any
interpretive contortions. However, recognizing some newsgathering
rights depends on a more egalitarian definition of “journalist”—one
that emphasizes the function served by newsgatherers, and not their
social or professional status or credentials. And although there is a
historical and constitutional foundation for many newsgathering
protections, some access claims and liability defenses—particularly
those that are dependent on an affirmative-rights construction of the
First Amendment—are not constitutionally cognizable, despite their
appeal as matters of policy.
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INTRODUCTION

T

he summer of 2007 should have been a propitious time for
Major League Baseball. With Sammy Sosa becoming only the
1
fifth player in league history to hit six hundred home runs, and Barry
Bonds eclipsing the most storied record in sports—Hank Aaron’s 755
career home runs—one might have expected the same kind of
ceremonial pomp that accompanied Mark McGwire’s sixty-second
home run in 19982 or Cal Ripken’s 2131st consecutive game in 1995.3
But with baseball still reeling from reports that some of its biggest
stars, including Sosa and Bonds, were steroid users, the 2007
celebrations were awkward and perfunctory.
Rumors of steroid use in baseball have percolated for years, but
the issue erupted after a March 2005 congressional hearing and the
publication of a series of news stories filled with damaging
disclosures,4 admissions,5 and accusations.6 The most explosive report
came from San Francisco Chronicle reporters Mark Fainaru-Wada

1. Babe Ruth, Willie Mayes, Hank Aaron, and Barry Bonds are the others. Career
Leaders & Records for Home Runs, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/leaders/
HR_career.shtml.
2. On September 8, 1998, McGwire broke Roger Maris’s record of sixty-one home runs in
a season. McGwire finished the season with seventy home runs. Barry Bonds broke McGwire’s
record when he hit seventy-three home runs in 2001.
3. On September 6, 1995, Ripken broke Lou Gehrig’s record of 2130 consecutive games
played. Ripken’s streak ended after 2,632 games in 1998.
4. During the March 17, 2005, hearing before the House Government Reform
Committee, McGwire effectively admitted his past steroid use by refusing to directly answer
questions on the subject. Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League
Baseball’s Efforts To Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
109th Cong. (2005). And less than five months after shaking his finger at the congressional
panel and declaring, “I have never used steroids. Period,” id. at 227, then-Baltimore Orioles
player Raphael Palmeiro was reported to have failed a steroid test. See Associated Press,
Palmeiro Still Not Sure Why He Tested Positive, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2005-12-28-palmeiro-steroid_x.htm.
5. The most prominent admission came from New York Yankee Jason Giambi who
conceded in December 2004 that he had used steroids. His brother Jeremy, a minor league
player, admitted the same in March 2005, just days before the congressional hearing. Todd
Zolecki, Ex-Phil Jeremy Giambi Admits To Using Steroids, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 14, 2005, at
C3. Previously, ex-players Ken Caminiti and Jose Canseco had made similar admissions. See
Larry Stone, Believe Canseco? We Might Have To, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at C1.
6. In April 2005, former Philadelphia Phillies player Lenny Dykstra was accused by his
friend and business partner of having used steroids. Associated Press, Between the Seams:
Dykstra Accused of Using Steroids, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=seam25&
date=20050425&query=dykstra+accused. Jose Canseco published a book replete with claims
that various major league players, including Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa, were steroid
users. JOSE CANSECO, JUICED (2005).
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and Lance Williams, who revealed that the Bay Area Laboratory
Cooperative (BALCO) did not merely manufacture nutritional
supplements, but also distributed exotic steroids. Williams and
Fairanu-Wada also provided compelling evidence that Bonds,
arguably the greatest player of his generation, was one of BALCO’s
steroid clients.7
Fainaru-Wada and Williams, who published their reports both in
the Chronicle and later in the book Game of Shadows, exposed
widespread criminal wrongdoing8 and were lionized for their work.
9
They were also subpoenaed. United States Attorney Debra Wong
Yang demanded that the reporters reveal the source of some of their
key information—specifically, leaked testimony from witnesses in the
10
grand jury investigation of BALCO.
When Fairanu-Wada and
Williams refused, the court held them in civil contempt and ordered
them to serve eighteen months in prison. Before their appeal could
be heard, defense attorney Troy Ellerman admitted to being the
source of the secret testimony, so the subpoenas were withdrawn.11
Had Ellerman not come forward, Fairanu-Wada and Williams
would likely have gone to prison. The federal courts have taken a
jaundiced view of reporter–source confidentiality over the past
12
several years, and rulings in some high-profile cases have

7. The reporters say Bonds was jealous about the success of McGuire, who broke Roger
Maris’s single-season home-run record in 1999 while using androstenedione, which is now a
banned substance. Bonds decided then to start taking “the shit” in order to elevate his game
and reclaim the spotlight. MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS
xvi (2006).
8. It became illegal to use steroids without a prescription after passage of the Anabolic
Steroid Control Act of 1990. Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1902,
104 Stat. 4851 (1990). Distributors of steroids can be punished by up to five years in prison and
a $250,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2006).
9. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, No. CR 0690225 JSW, 2006 WL 2734275 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006).
10. Federal officials began investigating BALCO in 2003, and it has been the focus of a
grand jury proceeding ever since. So far, BALCO President Victor Conte and several
associates, including Bonds’s personal trainer, have been convicted, and others have been
indicted. Among the many athletes who have been linked to BALCO are Olympic sprinters
Tim Montgomery and Marion Jones, Olympic shot-putter C.J. Hunter, and Major League
Baseball players Giambi and Bonds. See FAINARU-WADA & WILLIAMS, supra note 7.
11. On July 12, 2007, Ellerman was sentenced to two and a half years in prison for his role
in the leak. See Bob Egelko, The BALCO Case: Judge Sends Leaker to Slammer, Chides Bush,
S.F. CHRON., July 13, 2007, at B4.
12. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (refusing to recognize a
reporter’s privilege). See also Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers and Fourth Estate Inmates:
The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385 (2006);
Kara A. Larson, The Demise of the First Amendment Reporter’s Privilege: Why this Current
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underscored reporters’ vulnerability to federal subpoenas. In 2006,
the Ninth Circuit upheld a contempt citation against freelance
videographer and blogger Joshua Wolf, who had been subpoenaed to
testify and to turn over video footage he gathered of a San Francisco
protest in which a police car was burned.13 Wolf was imprisoned for
226 days—the longest sentence ever served by a journalist for
refusing to comply with a subpoena—before he was released in April
2007.14
Two years earlier, the D.C. Circuit rejected New York Times
reporter Judith Miller’s attempts to quash a subpoena that sought the
name of the source who leaked to her the identity of undercover CIA
15
In that case, which grew out of
agent Valerie (Plame) Wilson.
Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald’s ongoing investigation into
illegal leaks at the White House,16 Miller was held in contempt and
spent eighty-five days in prison before securing a waiver from her

Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1235 (2005); Anthony L. Fargo, Is
Protection from Subpoenas Slipping? An Analysis of Three Recent Cases Involving Broadcast
News Outtakes, 47(3) J. OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 455 (2003).
13. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 Fed. App’x 430 (9th Cir. 2006).
14. Video Blogger is Now Longest-Jailed American Journalist, REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2007/0206con-videob.html.
15. Miller’s motion to quash was denied by U.S. District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan in
In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004). Her appeal of the
contempt citation was rejected by the D.C. Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,
397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh’g denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
2977 (2005). Citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655 (1972), the D.C. Circuit held that
journalists do not have a First Amendment right to refuse to comply with grand jury subpoenas.
In re Miller, 397 F.3d at 968. The Court neither accepted nor rejected Miller’s second argument
that she was entitled to journalist’s privilege protection under the federal common law. The
court was divided on the question of the existence of a common law privilege, but concluded
that even if one does exist, the government had provided sufficient evidence to overcome it. Id.
at 972–73.
16. This investigation is focused on whether government officials illegally leaked the
identity of undercover CIA agent Valerie Wilson, also known by her maiden name, Valerie
Plame, to reporters in the summer of 2003. The investigation was triggered by a column
published July 14, 2003, by Robert Novak, which disclosed that Plame, the wife of former
diplomat Joseph C. Wilson IV, was a CIA agent. Novak attributed this information to “two
administration sources.” As part of a grand jury inquiry into possible illegal leaks, Fitzgerald
subpoenaed several reporters to determine whether they had been told Plame’s identity by
government officials and to determine the names of those officials. Novak was the only
journalist to publish Plame’s name and the fact that she was an undercover agent. Some have
suggested that government officials deliberately leaked this information to reporters as an act of
retribution against Wilson who had written a July 2003 opinion piece in the New York Times
that debunked administration claims about Iraq’s possession and pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction.
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source.17 Shortly thereafter, Miller and a former colleague at the New
York Times, Philip Shenon, became the targets of another attempt by
the government to discover the identities of their confidential
sources—this time over stories the reporters wrote about a planned
government raid of two Islamic charities suspected of funding
terrorists. Fitzgerald, also the prosecutor in the Islamic charities case,
wanted to know who informed the reporters so he seized their phone
records. Miller and Shenon challenged the seizure, but the Second
Circuit rejected their claims,18 and in November 2006, the Supreme
19
Court refused to halt the government’s review of the records.
Miller, Shenon, Wolf, Fairanu-Wada, and Williams are the most
20
recent combatants in an ongoing, thirty-five-year struggle for judicial
recognition of a “reporter’s privilege”—the right of journalists to
refuse to comply with certain subpoenas seeking their testimony or
work products.21 Although these reporters’ legal battles have
rekindled interest in the privilege and spurred congressional
22
consideration of a federal shield law, the high profile of these

17. U.S. District Court Judge Thomas F. Hogan held Miller in contempt in October 2004.
On September 30, 2005, after receiving a waiver of confidentiality from her source, I. Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, Chief of Staff to Vice President Richard Cheney, Miller testified that although
she had had a confidential interview with Libby, and although the name “Valerie Flame” [sic]
appears in her notes from that interview, she did not believe that Libby mentioned Plame’s
name to her, and that the reference in her notes to “Valerie Flame” was from an interview with
a different source whose identity she could not recall. See Don Van Natta Jr. et al., The Miller
Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a Jail Cell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/national/16leak.htm. In March 2007, Libby was convicted of
perjury and obstruction of justice for lying to the grand jury and FBI officials about his role in
the case. On July 2, 2007, President George Bush commuted his sentence. See Amy Goldstein,
Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at A1.
18. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 721 (2006) (Mem.).
20. Wolf and Miller are two of at least twenty-two reporters jailed since 1972 for refusing
to comply with a subpoena seeking information related to newsgathering activity. See
Journalists Jailed, 25 THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW 28 (Fall 2001).
21. Work products can include notes, film negatives, videotape, outtakes, computer files,
audio recordings, and other materials.
22. Two bills are currently pending in Congress that would establish a shield law giving
journalists some protection against subpoenas in federal cases. The bills, H.R. 2102, sponsored
by Reps. Mike Pence (R-Ind.) and Rich Boucher (D-Va.), and S. 1267, sponsored by Sens.
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), were both introduced in their respective
chambers on May 2, 2007. The bills are identical and would provide broad protection for
journalists to conceal the identities of their confidential sources and substantial protection for
non-confidential work product as well. The bills also define “journalist” as anyone engaged in
the “gathering, preparing, collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or
publishing of news or information that concerns local, national or international events or other
matters of public interest for dissemination to the public.” H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(5).

04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC

2008]

DEMARCATING THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS

7/23/2008 9:34:02 AM

119

reporters has perhaps obscured the fact that they are just a few
among dozens who have been subpoenaed,23 fined,24 imprisoned,25 or
otherwise disciplined by judges and prosecutors in the past few years.
These reporter–court entanglements, many of which remain
unresolved, have laid bare the divisions among courts on the issue of
privilege. And they have exposed the doctrinal, historical, and
theoretical infirmities of the broader legal framework that governs
newsgathering, which not only protects source relationships, but also
protects against civil and criminal liability for torts and crimes
committed by journalists in the pursuit of news, protects against
newsroom searches, and protects access to places and records, among
other things. These problems have persisted for decades, and
resolving them has grown all the more urgent with the
Presumably, then, this protection would extend to bloggers and other non-traditional
journalists.
23. In the White House leak case, several other reporters were subpoenaed, including
Time’s Matthew Cooper, NBC’s Tim Russert and Andrea Mitchell, and the Washington Post’s
Bob Woodward, Walter Pincus, and Glenn Kessler. In December 2004, thirteen news
organizations were subpoenaed to provide information,including the identities of confidential
sources, in a civil Privacy Act suit brought by former FBI official James Hatfill who claimed he
was wrongly identified as a suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States. In July
2007, Hatfill sought the reporters’ confidential source information, and on August 14, 2007, U.S.
District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton ordered five reporters—Mickael Isikoff and Daniel
Klaidman of Newsweek, Allen Lengel of the Washington Post, Toni Locy of USA Today, and
James Swart of CBS News—to testify in the case. For more on these and other news media
subpoena
cases,
see
Reporters
and
Federal
Subpoenas,
http://www.rcfp.org/
shields_and_subpoenas.html.
24. In November 2005, for example, U.S. District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer held
Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus in contempt and ordered him to pay $500 per day for
refusing to disclose the names of his confidential sources in a civil case brought by former Los
Alamos Nuclear Laboratory physicist Wen Ho Lee against the Department of Justice and the
Department of Energy. Lee accused those agencies of violating the Privacy Act by releasing
private information about him without his consent. In August 2004, in this same proceeding,
five other reporters were held in contempt for refusing to reveal their sources. All but one of
the contempt citations were upheld on appeal by the D.C. Circuit. Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This case was settled in June 2006, with contributions to the
settlement by the subpoenaed media parties.
25. In addition to Joshua Wolf and Judith Miller, Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper
was also held in contempt in the White House leak investigation and was on the verge of going
to jail before securing a last-minute waiver of confidentiality from his source. Television
reporter Jim Taricani was sentenced to jail for contempt after refusing to identify his
confidential source to prosecutors investigating government corruption in Providence, R.I.
(Because Taricani has a heart condition, his sentence was later changed from jail time to home
confinement). And in 2001–2002, freelance author Vanessa Leggett was held in contempt for
refusing to turn over tapes of interviews she had conducted with witnesses whom prosecutors
believed had information relevant to a murder investigation. She served 168 days in jail—then
the longest sentence ever served by a reporter in a privilege case. Press Release, Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Vanessa Leggett Released From Jail After 168 Days (Jan.
4, 2002), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/releases/view.cgi?2002_01_04_vlreleas.txt.
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democratization of media and the emergence of a new cohort of
bloggers and other independent news providers who have challenged
traditional definitions of “journalists” and “the press.”
Although today’s media environment and broader social
conditions have changed since the early 1970s when debate over
newsgathering rights began in earnest, the fundamental questions
have not: is there a First Amendment right to gather news, who is
entitled to claim its protections, and over what behavior does it
extend? It is axiomatic that all citizens enjoy a right to express
themselves. The right to seek out information, however, is indistinct.
Over the past three decades, journalists have sought to broaden the
definition of press freedom to protect newsgathering, arguing that if
they are to serve the highest purposes of their profession, freedom of
the press must encompass more than the right to publish what they
know; it must also protect their pursuit of the unknown. Journalists
have therefore fought, with varied success, for judicial
acknowledgement of a right to attend judicial proceedings,26 to access
government records,27 to monitor activities in federal prisons,28 to
break promises with their confidential sources without being sued for
29
damages, to be protected against tort claims targeting their
newsgathering activity,30 and to be exempt from prosecution for
31
certain crimes committed in their pursuit of news. They have also
challenged restrictions that intrude too deeply on journalistic
autonomy and which they say have the potential to inhibit both
journalistic expression and investigative zeal.
These include
government subpoenas of their confidential materials,32 government
26. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (holding that the public,
including the press, has a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials).
27. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)
(holding that the government did not violate the Freedom of Information Act by refusing to
disclose the contents of FBI rap sheets).
28. Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (holding that a federal regulation
prohibiting press interviews with prison inmates did not violate the First Amendment).
29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that journalists have no First
Amendment protection against the application of generally applicable laws).
30. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
journalists enjoy no special immunity from tort claims arising from their newsgathering
behavior).
31. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910
(2000) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect journalists when they engage in
illegal conduct).
32. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that a journalist does not have a First
Amendment right to refuse to comply with a grand jury subpoena seeking testimony about
crimes he or she witnessed).
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searches of their newsrooms,33 and attempts to compel disclosure of
the details of their editorial decision-making processes.34 Journalists
argue that protecting against all of these encumbrances on
newsgathering is essential, not merely as a matter of public policy, but
as a matter of constitutional law.
Some courts have been sympathetic to these challenges, but many
have rejected them, showing little patience for what judges often
35
construe as media demands for “special rights.” The mixed success
of media litigants and the lack of conclusive rulings from the U.S.
Supreme Court have yielded a body of law that is conflicted in both
its outcomes and its rationales. The newsgathering rights of the press
vary across jurisdictions and few doctrinal or theoretical threads hold
the courts’ decisions together. Case law regarding the right to gather
news is almost entirely built around either ad hoc arguments or
mechanical applications of precedent. Rarely do judges connect their
rulings to broader theories of free expression, and even more rarely
do judges attempt to tie these determinations to a particular approach
to constitutional interpretation. To settle contemporary controversies
over the right to gather news, this Article moves past the courts’
desultory analyses, focuses on the core principles that underlie the
broader law of newsgathering, and situates those assessments in the
context of a specific approach to constitutional interpretation.
This Article pays special attention to three long-debated but
36
inadequately answered questions: (1) Should the Press Clause of the
First Amendment be interpreted as having a separate meaning apart
37
from the Speech Clause? More specifically, should the Press Clause

33. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding that journalists do not have a
First Amendment right to refuse to comply with an otherwise valid search warrant).
34. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (holding that journalists do not have a First
Amendment right to refuse to testify about their state of mind at the time they published
allegedly defamatory material).
35. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why
there need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or other
evidence sought is a journalist.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293,
296–97 (D.N.J. 1993) (“It is naïve to blindly acknowledge or adopt the unfettered First
Amendment freedoms espoused by the press . . . .”). Many courts also cite the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 738, which rejects the idea of “special safeguards” for the
press and also its opinion in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937), saying that
a newspaper “has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.” Id. (emphasis
added).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . .
the press . . . .”).
37. Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
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be read as bestowing a set of special rights on the press not possessed
by the public generally? (2) To the extent that any unique protections
are provided to the press, how should “the press” and “journalist” be
defined? (3) Does the First Amendment provide the press, the public,
or both a set of affirmative rights—rights of access to information or
places, for example—that protect non-expressive actions aimed at
uncovering rather than disseminating information?
These are questions most courts have avoided even though they
38
have been the subjects of scholarly examination. And they are at the
center of the longstanding constitutional quarrels over particular
newsgathering practices, the most important of which involve
autonomy (including not only the reporter’s privilege but also
protections against government inquiries into journalists’ editorial
decision-making and protections against newsroom searches), access
(including access to records, courts and government property), and
liability (including protection from both civil tort claims and criminal
charges stemming from journalists’ newsgathering activity).
This Article addresses these issues by proposing a “sequential”
interpretation of the First Amendment—an approach that assesses, in
turn, the text of the Amendment, its history, its place in the broader
constitutional structure, and its contemporary meaning in light of
substantial social change. This approach draws upon conventional
interpretive theories, each of which represents an essential line of
inquiry, but none of which is sufficient by itself. This Article shows
that constitutional support for recognizing most aspects of the right to
gather news, including the reporter’s privilege, is abundant and that
the Supreme Court’s treatment of these issues is fundamentally
flawed. Furthermore, even those who apply more conservative
interpretive approaches should find substantial evidence pointing to a
more expansive view than the one the Supreme Court and many
38. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002);
Matthew Bunker et al., Triggering the First Amendment: Newsgathering Torts and Press
Freedom, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273 (1999); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access and
the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press
Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); Anthony Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism? 7
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979); Floyd Abrams, The Press is Different: Reflections on Justice
Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565 (1979); William W. Van Alstyne,
The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a ‘Preferred Position,’ 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 HASTINGS L.J.
639 (1975); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641 (1967).
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lower courts have endorsed. However, recognizing some of these
newsgathering protections depends on a more egalitarian definition
of “journalist”—one that emphasizes the function served by
newsgatherers, and not their social or professional status or
credentials.39 And although there is a historical and constitutional
foundation for many newsgathering protections, some access claims
and liability defenses—particularly those that are dependent on an
affirmative-rights40 construction of the First Amendment—are not
constitutionally cognizable, despite their appeal as matters of public
policy.
Part I of this Article identifies the central questions that must be
answered to forge a consistent and sustainable First Amendment
jurisprudence and outlines the ways in which the current law of
newsgathering remains conflicted. Part II proposes a sequential
approach to constitutional interpretation and explains how that
theory fits within, and draws upon, the menu of traditional
approaches. Part III applies the sequential approach to the First
Amendment. Part IV provides an analysis of that application and
what it suggests about the constitutionality of particular
newsgathering restrictions. Part V concludes the Article by providing
a set of recommendations for reshaping the law of newsgathering.
I. THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS
To the extent that the law of newsgathering lacks clarity, much
blame lies with the Supreme Court, which has supplied a series of
indefinite rulings, beginning with its 1972 decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes.41 In Branzburg, the Court held that a reporter who witnesses
illegal activity does not have a First Amendment right to refuse to
comply with a grand jury subpoena, even if complying would expose

39. See Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who is a Journalist, What is the Press and Why
Does it Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 1
(2007) (distinguishing this egalitarian model from an “expert model, in which journalists are
conceived of as a uniquely qualified and clearly identifiable collection of professionals who
serve as agents of the public in the procurement and dissemination of news”).
40. Affirmative or positive rights are those that give the press, the public, or both a right of
access to information or property within the government’s legitimate control. They provide
freedom for the press, as opposed to most negative rights that provide freedom from the
government. In this sense, an affirmative right is a sword used to secure some action from the
government and a negative right is a shield used to repel government encroachments. See infra
Part I.C.
41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC

124

7/23/2008 9:34:02 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 3:113

the identity of a confidential source.42 Writing for the majority, Justice
Byron White rejected the idea that reporters should be afforded
special protections not possessed by the public generally.43
Nevertheless, his opinion contained an important concession: “News
44
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections.” In fact,
White wrote that “without some protection for seeking out the news,
45
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” White did not define
this right, but acknowledging some level of protection for
newsgathering seemed to foreclose any suggestion that the rights of
the press extend only to what journalists publish.
Although White’s opinion was clear about the disposition of the
cases before the Court, it did not address many of the underlying
doctrinal and theoretical questions. Its precedential weight was also
limited by the fact the full opinion had the support of only four
justices. Justice Lewis Powell issued the decisive vote and held against
the journalists in Branzburg, but recommended a case-by-case
46
assessment of the necessity of subpoenas. This effectively made
Branzburg a 4.5-to-4.5 decision, which gave lower courts latitude to
47
supply their own interpretations. Some federal circuit courts have
interpreted Branzburg as rejecting a First Amendment reporter’s
privilege,48 others have recognized a qualified privilege under either
49
the First Amendment or federal common law, and some have even

42. The defendant, Paul Branzburg, was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who,
after promising confidentiality to a source, witnessed the source turning marijuana into hashish.
The Court consolidated Branzburg’s case with two companion cases, In re Pappas and United
States v. Caldwell, both of which involved journalists who had been given access to the Black
Panthers organization on condition that they not publicly identify its members. Like Branzburg,
journalists Earl Caldwell and Paul Pappas refused to testify after being subpoenaed by grand
juries. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. The Court refused to shield any of these reporters from having
to respond to the grand jury subpoenas.
43. Id. at 683.
44. Id. at 707.
45. Id. at 681.
46. Id. at 710 (arguing that each case “should be judged on its facts by the striking of a
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct”) (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Note, however, that the rule that the press enjoys at least some protection to gather
news was not limited by Powell’s concurrence. Indeed, all nine justices agreed that some
government restrictions of newsgathering would be unconstitutional, although it did not provide
examples.
48. E.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming Branzburg
and criticizing other federal circuit courts that recognized a reporter’s privilege outside the
grand jury context); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
49. E.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963
(5th Cir. 1998); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign,
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concluded that Branzburg itself recognized a privilege.50 In addition,
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted shield
laws establishing varying degrees of protection,51 Congress is
52
considering a federal shield law, and many state courts have
interpreted their state constitutions53 or state common law54 as
providing some protection for reporters.
As such, the law of reporter’s privilege is riddled with
discontinuities. Each jurisdiction provides a different level of
protection, each relies upon different rationales, and each employs
different definitions so that the ability of reporters to quash
subpoenas depends entirely on where they work. The law governing
other newsgathering practices is similarly uneven, so there is certainly
a need for the Supreme Court to reenter the field and provide some
doctrinal and theoretical ballast. The Court will almost certainly get
that chance in the next year or two as reporters like Fainaru-Wada,
841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986).
50. Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. See Federal Shield Laws Introduced in Both Houses, Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press (May 2, 2007), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/2007/0502-confedera.html. The shield-law states are the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. Most shield laws provide qualified
protection, using a version of the three-part balancing test proposed by Justice Stewart in his
dissenting opinion in Branzburg. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Under that test,
parties can only compel a response to a subpoena when they can:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that
is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the
information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.
Id. The Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act provides a representative example of the ways
in which states have codified Stewart’s dissent. It compels the disclosure of covered materials
only if the party seeking disclosure proves:
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that the specific information sought (i) is
clearly relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony, or (ii) is clearly relevant to a
misdemeanor so long as the information would not tend to identify the source of the
information or the means through which it was obtained, (2) that the information
cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedy less destructive of first
amendment rights, and (3) that there is a compelling and overriding interest requiring
the disclosure of the information where the disclosure is necessary to prevent injustice.
Minn Stat. § 595.024, subd. 2 (1998).
52. See supra note 22.
53. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); O’Neill v. Oakgrove
Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1988); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1987).
54. See, e.g., Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982).
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Williams, and the dozens of others currently under subpoena appeal
their contempt citations. If and when the Court does intervene, it will
have to more squarely address the three core questions that have
been at the heart of this debate since the beginning: (1) Does the
Press Clause have a meaning separate from the Speech Clause that
endows journalists with a unique set of constitutional protections?
(2) Does the First Amendment protect both affirmative (positive)
rights and negative rights?55 (3) Who is a journalist?
A. “Special Rights”: Speech v. Press
While Branzburg may not have emboldened American journalists
and their advocates, it did not discourage them either. In the
subsequent decade, news organizations brought suits seeking access to
judicial proceedings,56 prisons,57 and government records.58 They
sought to establish the autonomy of news organizations and their
editorial processes by challenging the execution of search warrants on
newsrooms59 and protesting laws forcing news organizations to
publish material they do not want to publish.60 And in the face of
Branzburg, news organizations continued to urge recognition of a
61
reporter’s privilege.

55. Affirmative rights are distinct from negative rights in that they protect actions and
behavior that are non-expressive. Rights of access to records or places, for example, are
affirmative rights, whereas negative rights protect people from government intrusions on their
liberty or autonomy. As applied to journalists, negative rights guard the news media from
government restrictions of their expression—what they actually publish or broadcast. Negative
rights also prevent government actions that interfere with the media’s editorial independence.
To put it simply, negative rights are more shield than sword because they prevent the
government from restricting journalists’ expressive functions; affirmative rights are more sword
than shield because they give journalists the power to make demands on government (access to
the courts, for example).
56. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (seeking recognition
a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials).
57. E.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 (1973) (seeking recognition of a First
Amendment right of access to federal prisons).
58. E.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978) (seeking access to
judicial records).
59. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563 (1978) (seeking recognition of at least
a qualified privilege under the First Amendment against enforcement of newsroom searches).
60. E.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1976) (arguing that a statute
giving political candidates a right to reply in any newspaper to criticism of them was
unconstitutional).
61. It is not uncommon for these arguments to prevail. Most state courts now recognize
some constitutional or common law protections for journalists, and most federal courts also
recognize at least a qualified reporter’s privilege. See generally Reporter’s Privilege:
Compendium, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, available at
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Media lawyers found support for their claims from Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart, whose 1974 speech at Yale Law School,
later published as a law review article,62 provoked considerable
63
scholarly reflection on the meaning of the Press Clause and whether
it provides a set of rights separate from those guaranteed by the
Speech Clause.64 In particular, media lawyers clung to Stewart’s
suggestion that the Press Clause uniquely protects the institution of
the press—by which he meant the “daily newspapers and other
established news media”65—that are not provided to all other citizens
under the Speech Clause. The Speech Clause merely protects citizens’
right of free expression. The Press Clause, however, has a separate
purpose. The Clause provides the press with the freedom not only to
publish but also to seek out the news and to serve as a “fourth
institution outside the Government [acting] as an additional check on
the three official branches.”66 By using the words “or of the press” the
Framers meant something, Stewart argued, otherwise the Press Clause
67
Critics of Stewart
would be “a constitutional redundancy.”
challenged this idea, because it would authorize a tiered system of
rights, would require judges to define who is a journalist, and could
potentially lead to public demands that the press abide by certain
ethical standards.68 As Justice White noted in Branzburg, this is a
“questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods.”69
The Supreme Court has largely, but not entirely, rejected the idea
of special rights for the press. Although Justice White’s opinion in
Branzburg argued against any special accommodations, the Court’s
subsequent decisions in a series of libel cases implied that a different

http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.php (listing various legal protections for journalists in
jurisdictions across the country).
62. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . .
the press.”)
64. Id.
65. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631.
66. Id. at 634.
67. Id. at 633.
68. See Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege
for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1979); Van Alstyne, supra note 38.
69. 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
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set of constitutional standards might be required for the press. In
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, the Court held that “the commonlaw presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a
plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public
concern.”70 The Court used similar language in other media-related
cases as well.71 By singling out media defendants, the Court seemed to
suggest that they are empowered with additional protections. This
contradicts the egalitarian spirit of Branzburg, as well as most of the
Court’s subsequent rulings, including Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.72 In
Cohen, the Court held that when journalists break their promises of
confidentiality to sources, they can be sued for damages under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel73 without upsetting the First
74
Amendment:
“[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade
the rights of others.” Accordingly, enforcement of such laws against
the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to
75
enforcement against other persons or organizations.

70. 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (emphasis added).
71. See Milcovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (“[A] statement on
matters of public concern must be provable as false . . . at least in situations, like the present,
where a media defendant is involved.” (emphasis added)); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 499 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the law prohibits states “from imposing
strict liability for media publication of allegedly false statements” (emphasis added)); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (making repeated references to the interests of “media”
defendants in libel cases); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971) (“We
expressly leave open the question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the
enforcement of state libel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news
media.” (emphasis added)).
72. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
73. Promissory estoppel is “the principle that a promise made without consideration may
nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promisor should have reasonably expected
the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to his
or her detriment.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999).
74. In this case, an aide to a Republican gubernatorial candidate approached reporters for
both the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press to offer “damaging”
information about the opposing candidate, provided they not identify him as the source of the
information. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665–66. The reporters agreed, but their editors overrode their
promises of confidentiality, believing that the information was so inconsequential that the public
deserved to know both the information and who provided it. Id. (The opposing candidate had
once been charged with stealing $6 worth of sewing supplies, and the conviction was later
vacated.).
75. Id. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)) (alterations
in the original) (emphasis added).
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This view certainly has some appeal. Special status is inconsistent
with the constitutional premise of equality under law.76 Less clear is
whether the general applicability of a law is all that need be
considered. Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Harry Blackman,
Thurgood Marshall, and Sandra Day O’Connor, argued in dissent in
Cohen:
Thus “there is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general
applicability,” for such laws may restrict First Amendment rights
just as effectively as those directed specifically at speech itself.
Because I do not believe the fact of general applicability to be
dispositive, I find it necessary to articulate, measure, and compare
77
the competing interests involved.

The Court’s unwillingness to weigh these contextual factors and
its disregard of the broader principle of autonomy are apparent in
several other cases as well. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Court
held that the First Amendment does not shield a news organization
from having its offices searched pursuant to a valid warrant because
the Fourth Amendment provides adequate protection against any
unreasonable interference.78 The staff of the Stanford Daily would
surely disagree, as would the lawyers for the New York Times who,
nearly twenty years after Zurcher, were unable to prevent the federal
government from seizing reporters’ phone records in the Islamic
charities case.79 That case provides just one recent example of the
inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment as a shield against government
80
usurpations of media independence.
76. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall deprive any person of . . . the
equal protection of the laws.”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)
(“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”). This principle is
given force through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and has also
been upheld in the First Amendment context. See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (invalidating a state tax that targeted only certain types of publications);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592–93 (1983)
(striking down a use tax on ink and paper because it singled out the print press for disparate
treatment).
77. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 677 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990)) (internal citation omitted).
78. 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978). The Court did suggest, however, that search warrants
targeting the press be reviewed with “‘scrupulous exactitude.’” Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)).
79. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
80. Largely in response to Zurcher, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act, which
shields news organizations against searches or seizures of most work products or documentary
materials. This law does not prohibit searches or subpoenas of third parties, however. 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa (1980).
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The Court applied a similar framework in Herbert v. Lando when
it held that news organizations have no First Amendment privilege to
refuse to respond to inquiries by plaintiffs in libel cases about the
81
organization’s editorial decision-making processes. Anyone suing
for defamation must prove that the allegedly defamatory statements
were published with fault, which is difficult to do without knowing
what information the journalists knew or had access to prior to
publication.82 But the Court again took this neutrality principle to the
extreme, seeing no threats to editorial autonomy by litigants being
able to probe the details of news organizations’ private editorial
meetings, discussions, and processes.83 Instead of recognizing the risk
of abuse and at a minimum establishing a qualified protection,84 the
Court treated the media’s autonomy arguments as little more than
brazen demands for special status.85
The Court’s application of a rigid, no-special-rights template and
its unwillingness to recognize the media’s claims as attempts to
86
vindicate public rights rather than plots to secure private protections
are two of the central flaws of the Court’s newsgathering
jurisprudence. These flaws are all the more conspicuous now that
changes in the media marketplace have eroded the press–public
distinction.87 That should have been recognized in Cohen in 1991;
instead, the Court again refused to make any allowance for context
88
and treated the media’s claims as largely self-serving.
In Cohen, the Court echoed earlier precedents in holding that
journalists have no constitutional protection against the application of
“generally applicable laws” regardless of how substantially they might
89
This is facially
impair newsgathering or dissemination.

81. 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979).
82. Id. at 156–57.
83. Id. at 171–74.
84. Justice Brennan suggested as much in his dissenting opinion, arguing that plaintiffs
should be forced to demonstrate that a publication is both false and defamatory before inquiring
into a communicator’s editorial processes. Id. at 197–198.
85. Id. at 165–69.
86. See infra Part I.B.
87. The proliferation of weblogs and other inexpensive online communications media has
enabled those without traditional credentials and training to compete with mainstream news
outlets. This has triggered considerable debate over the question of who is a journalist. See
generally Ugland & Henderson, supra note 39.
88. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669–70.
89. Id. at 670 (“It is therefore beyond dispute that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no
special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
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unremarkable. But the Cohen decision, building off of Branzburg,
Zurcher, and Herbert, provided the foundation for dozens of lawsuits
over the past fifteen years in which plaintiffs have sued news
organizations, not over what was published or broadcast, but over the
methods used in gathering the information.90 By targeting the media’s
newsgathering behavior, plaintiffs have—with mixed success—
avoided the formidable constitutional shield that protects media
expression.91
92
The best exemplar is Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
which involved a civil suit by the Food Lion grocery chain against
ABC over its “Prime Time Live” undercover investigation of
unsanitary conditions at Food Lion stores.93 After lying on their job
applications and getting hired as Food Lion employees, ABC
reporters used hidden cameras and microphones to document
unhealthy and illegal food handling practices.94 Food Lion brought
suit for fraud, trespass, unfair trade practices, and breach of the duty
95
of loyalty, but did not sue for defamation. Food Lion knew it would
be easier to sue on those grounds and still persuade a sympathetic

rights and liberties of others.’” (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–133
(1937) (alteration in original))).
90. Buoyed by the “generally applicable laws” rationale from Cohen, many plaintiffs have
since sued journalists under various theories, see, e.g., W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34
F. Supp. 2d 612, 614 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (fraud); Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television,
584 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (trespass); Ruzika v. Conde Nast Publ’n, Inc., 999
F.2d 1319, 1320 (8th Cir. 1993) (promissory estoppel); Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92,
101 (1st Cir. 2000) (misrepresentation); Shulman v. Group W Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal.
1998) (intrusion); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D.
Ariz. 1998)) (tortious interference with contract); Berger v. Cable News Network, No. CV 9446-BLG-JDS, 1996 WL 390528, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 26, 1996) (conversion); and several other
civil causes of action. These suits have targeted a variety of journalistic activities—police “ridealongs,” the use of hidden cameras and microphones, the use of deception to uncover news, and
the use of stolen documents or information in news reports.
91. See, e.g., Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (where plaintiff sued for
intrusion instead of libel after ABC aired a hidden-camera investigation of plaintiff’s telephone
psychic hotline business, ultimately eliciting a $900,000 settlement from the defendant). But see
Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding ABC liable for
trespass and breach of the duty of loyalty in their undercover investigation of Food Lion grocery
stores, but refusing to award any damages related to the broadcast itself).
92. Food Lion, 194 F.3d 505.
93. Id. at 510.
94. Id. at 510–11.
95. Id. at 510.
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jury to award punitive damages.96 The strategy worked and Food Lion
won at the trial court level.97
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that, although journalists are
not immune from liability for the torts they commit in their pursuit of
98
news, the First Amendment prevents awarding damages based on
what they publish or broadcast.99 This was a victory for the press
because plaintiffs like Food Lion are less likely to sue if they are
constitutionally prohibited from recovering publication-related
damages. But the court left the door open to these kinds of suits by
not offering any First Amendment protection for newsgathering
activity,100 as opposed to the subsequent publication, and by not
foreclosing the ability of plaintiffs to obtain punitive damages for de
101
The crux of Food Lion is that the First
minimus tort violations.
Amendment protects journalists in their expressive function, but it
does not protect them against civil liability in their newsgathering or
investigative function.
In 2000, the Fourth Circuit reinforced this view in the criminal
102
The court held that radio
case of United States. v. Matthews.
producer Larry Matthews did not have constitutional immunity to
download child pornography from the Internet, despite his claim that
he was doing research for a freelance news story.103 Several news
organizations supported Matthews’ appeals, arguing, like the four
96. See id. at 522.
97. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923 (M.D.N.C. 1997). The
jury awarded Food Lion $1,402 in compensatory damages and over $5 million in punitive
damages, id. at 927, later reduced by the court to $315,000, id. at 939. The Fourth Circuit
reversed in part, holding that by allowing Food Lion to sue for non-reputational torts while still
allowing the broadcast to be considered in the calculation of damages, Food Lion was doing an
end run around the First Amendment. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 524.
98. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520 (citing Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991)).
99. Id. at 522–24.
100. The court did cite the Supreme Court’s statement in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), that newsgathering activity does enjoy some protection, but like the Branzburg Court,
the Fourth Circuit did not elaborate on what activities that right protects or how far it extends.
Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681).
101. Although the court rejected the availability of publication damages, it would be
difficult, as a practical matter, for jurors not to consider at least subconsciously what was
published or broadcast when calculating punitive damages. Indeed, one of the Food Lion jurors
said after the trial that she wanted to award the grocery company $1 billion in damages. See
Linda Lightfoot, Editors Hear the Roar of the Food Lion Case, AM. SOC’Y OF NEWSPAPER
EDITORS, Jan. 1, 1997, available at http://www.asne.org/kiosk/editor/97.jan-feb/lightfoot1.htm.
So, one could argue that the court’s limitation on publication damages is only a modest, and
perhaps illusory, safeguard against tort suits aimed at journalists’ newsgathering.
102. 209 F.3d 338, 339 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000).
103. Id.
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dissenters in Cohen,104 that it is insufficient to simply say journalists
are not above the law and end the analysis there.105 Courts must go
further in considering context to ensure that the enforcement of
otherwise valid criminal laws does not unduly restrain First
Amendment interests. Nevertheless, courts have consistently rejected
a First Amendment defense in cases involving journalists’ alleged
106
criminal behavior.
The lower court decisions in civil cases are far from uniform. In
107
intrusion cases, some courts, cognizant of the special-rights dilemma
posed by the Court in Branzburg, have built their opinions entirely
108
Other courts have better
around the no-immunity principle.
appreciated the First Amendment implications of these suits and the
need to preserve those interests by narrowing the public’s legally
enforceable zone of privacy.109 Similarly, in trespass cases,110 some

104. See supra text accompanying note 77.
105. Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant Seeking Reversal at 1, 10, United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338 (4th
Cir. 2000) (No. 99-4183). The Reporters Committee was joined by the Society of Professional
Journalists, National Public Radio and the Radio-Television News Directors Association. Id. at
iv. They argued that:
when an individual engaged in constitutionally protected activity, such as
newsgathering, violates a law that directly affects that protected activity, and the
violation does not cause the harm the law seeks to proscribe, that individual should be
allowed to argue at trial as an affirmative defense that the First Amendment protects
his actions.
Id. at 5.
106. Reporters have been charged, and their First Amendment defenses have been rejected,
in cases involving criminal trespass, Stahl v. Oklahoma, 665 P.2d 839, 840 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983), criminal harassment, Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 991–92 (2d Cir. 1973), and
disorderly conduct, City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1989), among many
others. The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533
(2001), but added that while a person can be punished for illegally obtaining information, the
subsequent publication of that information by a third party is protected by the First
Amendment, provided it is of public interest and the disseminating party played no role in the
illegal acquisition. Id. at 525, 533–34.
107. Intrusion is one of the four common-law privacy torts identified first by Prosser and
recognized to varying degrees by state courts. WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER’S HANDBOOK OF
The others are public disclosure of private facts,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (1971).
appropriation and false light. Id. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a person
who “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for [intrusion], if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
108. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
precincts of another’s home or office.”).
109. See, e.g., Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206, 217–18 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
plaintiff did not have reasonable expectation that her conversations with others during an
outdoor memorial service at a cemetery would be private); Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460,
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courts have refused to award damages on First Amendment grounds
where the plaintiff has suffered no apparent harm,111 while other
courts have awarded nominal damages in such cases.112 Results are
also mixed in fraud cases. Some courts have dismissed these cases
113
where the plaintiff has not suffered direct harm and other courts
have allowed them to go forward even in the absence of any
114
demonstrable injury.
Courts that refuse to recognize the rights of newsgatherers in
these contexts make three key mistakes. The first is that these courts
tend to characterize the claims of defendants as all-or-nothing appeals
115
What most proponents of newsgathering
for blanket immunity.
protections seek, however, is not “a license . . . to violate valid criminal
116
laws,” but the creation of some evidentiary barrier that plaintiffs
and prosecutors would have to surmount before liability (in the civil
context) or guilt (in the criminal context) could be found.117 Much
466 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137 (1998) (finding that plaintiff did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when she was being questioned at the front door of her house,
which was visible to the street); Stressman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687
(Iowa 1987) (holding that a woman did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public
restaurant). However, courts are still somewhat divided about what constitutes a public place.
See Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that the surreptitious
recording of a police officer’s undercover investigation of a massage parlor was newsworthy and
concluding that “no right of privacy against intrusion can be said to exist with reference to the
gathering and dissemination of news concerning [an officer’s] discharge of public duties”).
Compare McCall v. Courier Journal and Louisville-Times Co., 609 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980), rev’d on other grounds, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981) (holding that an attorney could not
sustain an intrusion claim against a client who surreptitiously recorded their conversation in her
office), with Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 71, 73–74 (Cal. 1999) (holding that employees
have at least a limited expectation of privacy in their workplace).
110. See Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (“A person commits trespass when that person enters another’s land without consent.”
(citing Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 403 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))).
111. Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23128, at *8–9
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2001).
112. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998).
113. See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190–91 (D.Ariz.
1998); Homsy v. King World Entm’t, Inc., No. 01-96-00708-CV, 1997 WL 52154, at *5 (Tex.
App. Feb. 6, 1997).
114. See, e.g., Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 794.
115. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682–683 (1972) (“It is clear that the First
Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes . . . .”); United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293,
296–297 (D.N.J. 1993) (“It is naïve to blindly acknowledge or adopt the unfettered First
Amendment freedoms espoused by the press . . . .”).
116. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
117. See, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal & Sheree Martin, Triggering the First
Amendment: Newsgathering Torts and Press Freedom, 4 COMM. L. & POL’Y 273, 294 (1999)
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like the libel context, where liability only attaches when some level of
fault is proved, similar safeguards in the newsgathering context would
protect journalists unless plaintiffs or prosecutors could demonstrate
a superior interest. The construction of the First Amendment
proposed in this Article does not put newsgathering behavior in a
special category. But because many of the civil tort claims and some
of the criminal prosecutions targeting newsgathering are so prone to
abuse,118 some protection ought to be recognized—not to immunize
journalists’ investigative activity, but to prevent subtle and indirect
assaults on expressive activity.
The second key problem with the courts’ treatment of these cases
is that they expressly or impliedly characterize the defendants’ claims
119
But the media litigants in
as demands for special rights.
newsgathering cases have routinely made clear that they are seeking
judicial recognition of protections claimable by all people who gather

(arguing that, in newsgathering tort cases, “the plaintiff must establish a compelling interest in
vindicating the common-law newsgathering claim alleged”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the
Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1143, 1162 (1999–2000) (proposing that tort claims aimed at newsgathering be subjected to
at least intermediate constitutional scrutiny—that is, newsgathering should be protected “unless
it can be proven that there is an important interest gained by allowing liability”); Paul A. LeBel,
The Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort
Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145, 1154–55 (1995–
1996) (suggesting that newsgathering activity be treated as constitutionally parallel to
publication and a balancing approach be applied to newsgathering-related tort claims, much like
the courts have balanced the competing interests involved in libel and privacy cases).
118. These suits can be used as a pretext to seek compensation for the harms associated with
a publication or broadcast, allowing the plaintiff to skirt the First Amendment shield that
protects expression. This kind of tactic has been repudiated by the Supreme Court in a slightly
different context. See Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (rejecting attempt by plaintiff to
seek reputation-related damages by suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress rather
than libel). See also Nathan Siegel, Commentary, Newsgathering and Privacy Rights, 1999 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 207, 215 (1999) (“[E]ven though [Food Lion] was supposed to be an issue about a
generally applicable law, no one, neither Food Lion nor ABC, could find a single precedent . . .
where any company had ever tried to assert that kind of claim against any one of its entry-level
employees. That suggests to me that we’re not really dealing here with general laws. Rather,
we’re dealing here with an attempt to bend the law to try to find a basis to sue over news
reports.”).
119. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 n.1 (1979) (noting that the Court’s prior
rulings “provide no support for the theory that the prepublication editorial process enjoys a
special status under the First Amendment”); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570 (1978)
(“[T]here is no justification for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment procedure
for the press . . . .”) (Powell, J., concurring); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The
Constitution does not . . . require government to accord the press special access to information .
. . .”); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why there need to
be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a
journalist.”) (emphasis added).
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and disseminate news, not merely those employed by traditional news
organizations. The special-rights dilemma, then, is largely illusory, at
least when operating under an egalitarian definition of the press.120
B. Defining “The Press”
Those opposed to recognizing a constitutionally distinct status for
journalists or the press point to the difficulty of defining the types of
people or organizations that ought to be able to claim those
protections.121 As Justice White wrote in Branzburg, trying to define
who is a journalist would “present practical and conceptual difficulties
122
of a high order.” It is possible to avoid the definitional problem of
who is a journalist, but it would require reversing decisions by each of
the federal courts that have recognized the journalist’s privilege, and
it would require rewriting dozens of state and federal laws that give
journalists special dispensations.123 Irrespective of the constitutional
validity of special rights, the contemporary reality is that such
protections exist and cannot be effectively implemented in the
absence of a definition. The question is no longer whether
“journalist” or “the press” should be defined, but how.
Several criteria could apply in forming a definition. Looking to
membership in professional associations might help, but because
journalists are not licensed like doctors and lawyers, many qualified
journalists might not seek such memberships. Education is another
possibility, but certainly there are excellent reporters and editors who
do not have journalism degrees. Employment could likewise be the
operative criterion. Under the New York shield law, for example, one
must be a “professional journalist”—that is, someone working as a
120. See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 39. See also infra Part I.B.
121. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters employed by Time
Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants, or do we extend that protection as well
to the owner of a desktop printer producing a weekly newsletter?”) (Sentelle, J., concurring).
122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
123. See discussion of shield laws, supra notes 22, 51. In addition to shield laws, many
freedom of information laws allow for waivers of photocopying and search fees related to
records requests by journalists. E.g., The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2002) (“[F]ees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges . . . when
records are not sought for commercial use and the request is made by . . . a representative of the
news media . . . .”). Many states also have retraction statutes that require libel plaintiffs suing
news organizations to first seek a retraction before filing suit. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.05(2)
(“Before any civil action shall be commenced on account of any libelous publication . . . the
libeled person shall first give those alleged to be responsible or liable for the publication a
reasonable opportunity to correct the libelous matter.”).
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journalist “for gain or livelihood.”124 But this definition eliminates
anyone supplying news who does not receive a paycheck, including
many freelancers and most bloggers. Another possible basis for a
definition could be the type of organization involved. But would a
reporter for the New York Times count and not someone who writes
for a trade publication or People magazine? Protections could be
limited to traditional news media, but would it make sense to grant
privileges to a reporter from National Review and not one from
Talking Points Memo? Another approach would be to define
journalists based on the function they are performing. The reporter’s
privilege could be made available to anyone serving a press
function—seeking out news of public interest for the purpose of
disseminating it to an audience—whether or not the person possesses
any of the other attributes or affiliations described above.
Courts have not reached a consensus about the shape that a
definition should take. The Supreme Court has provided little
guidance, and the lower court approaches and statutory definitions
are inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary.125 The definition proposed
here is built around the last of the criteria discussed above—function.
126
This seems to be the direction favored by most circuit courts, and it
is the only approach that can be squared with the ethos of equality
127
that pervades the Constitution. At its core, newsgathering is simply
collecting information for the purpose of presenting it to an audience.
Although employees of mainstream news organizations most often
undertake this task, there is nothing to prevent a non-traditional
journalist or an ambitious do-it-yourselfer from engaging in the same
activity with the same intentions and achieving the same result.
Because all people have the ability to serve this investigative
function—whether or not they have any relevant training, experience

124. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (a)(6) (2007).
125. For example, many state shield laws only protect those who are “salaried employees”
of a news organization. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a) (2007). Many retraction statutes
only protect print publications. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 895.05(02) (2006). And some laws, like
one of the earlier versions of the proposed federal shield law, which was never enacted into law,
would not cover those working solely for Web-only organizations. H.R. 3323 § 5(2), 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
126. See, e.g., von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (affording the
privilege to one who has “the intent to use the material—sought, gathered or received—to
disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the
newsgathering process”).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 213–216.
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or credentials—these prerogatives should not belong to a preferred
class.
This does not, however, mean that all citizens should be able to
refuse to comply with subpoenas. This protection should belong
solely to those serving a press function. Such individuals would be
those (1) engaged in the process of gathering information of public
significance, (2) for the purpose of communicating it to an audience,
(3) with the intent at the start of the newsgathering process to
distribute the information to others, and (4) whose compliance with
the government’s demand would pose a legitimate risk of impairing
their future expressive or newsgathering activity. This proposed
definition avoids the special-rights problem by providing protection
to anyone whose actions serve the purposes of press freedom. The
definition also acknowledges the democratizing and decentralizing
role played by the Internet and other new media technology. And,
perhaps most importantly, it is a definition that does not require any
judicial improvisation, but flows naturally from the sequential
interpretation of the First Amendment applied here.
Should the Supreme Court revisit the reporter’s privilege issue, it
ought to recognize that the egalitarian conception of the press
envisaged by Justice White in Branzburg128 is not the bane of the
privilege, but its salvation. By distributing these protections based on
the functions newsgatherers perform instead of their characteristics,
credentials, or professional affiliations, the Court would solve the
special-rights problem and simplify the definitional dilemma. The
only remaining challenge for journalists would be to convince the
Court that the reporter’s privilege—as well as the protections sought
in Zurcher,129 Herbert,130 and Cohen131—can be recognized without
doing damage to the rest of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. Those protections are necessary to preserve the
autonomy of those who gather and disseminate news and are, unlike
the access cases described next, not merely affirmative rights
(privileges, in the truer sense of the word) but negative rights—shields

128. 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) (“The informative function asserted by representatives of the
organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists,
academic researchers, and dramatists.”).
129. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
130. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
131. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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against intrusions by the government into journalists’ processes,
property, and private relationships.132
C. Affirmative v. Negative Rights
As with the other questions addressed above, there is a similar
absence of uniformity regarding whether the First Amendment
provides merely a negative barrier against government intrusions or
also provides a set of affirmative rights—rights of access to places and
information, for example. Affirmative rights in this context are those
that protect actions aimed at uncovering, rather than disseminating
information. Negative rights protect people from government
encroachment on their liberties—both their expression and, it is
suggested here, their autonomy.133
In the 1970s and 1980s, some journalists and First Amendment
advocates sought judicial recognition of a constitutional right of
access built around a nebulous right-to-know principle.134 The
Supreme Court had previously frustrated these efforts in Zemel v.
Rusk, holding that the government can limit the countries to which
American citizens may travel.135 But in Lamont v. Postmaster General
136
of the United States, the Court struck down Post Office rules
permitting the destruction of “communist propaganda” sent through
the mails, holding that the rules violated the First Amendment rights
of the intended recipient.137 In so holding, the Court acknowledged a
limited right to receive information, which it affirmed and extended in

132. For more on the affirmative–negative distinction, see supra notes 40, 55.
133. Some scholars propose an affirmative rights model with a decidedly different focus.
They argue that freedom of speech and press are rights that the public possesses, not merely
against government infringement but against all infringement, and that the government is free
to advance people’s expressive opportunities even if doing so requires limiting the speech of
some (for example, the mainstream media) for the broader use and benefit of the many. See,
e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 340–43 (Indiana Univ. Press
1973). The Supreme Court has rejected this view, most notably in Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974), striking down a statute that required newspapers to give
political candidates a right of reply.
134. David Mitchell Ivester, Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109 (1977); Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1 (1976).
135. 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
136. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
137. Id. at 305 (construing Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, 39
U.S.C. § 4008(a) (2000), which required destruction of unsealed materials deemed to be
communist propaganda unless the intended recipient submitted a reply card indicating his or
her desire to receive the materials).
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subsequent cases.138 However, the Court was only recognizing a
negative right against government interference with the exchange of
information by private citizens. In a series of rulings in the 1970s
involving access to prisons—a more clearly affirmative-rights
context—the Court was far more skeptical. In Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co.139 and Pell v. Procunier,140 the Court held that neither
journalists nor the public have a First Amendment right of access to
141
142
prisons. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., another case involving prison
access, the Supreme Court added, “This Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of
information within government control.”143 In these cases, the Court
referenced its earlier ruling in Adderley v. Florida,144 in which it held
that “the State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.”145 Most lower courts have followed suit, limiting
press and public rights of access to places where their presence would
not interfere with the intended use of the property, although the
courts’ rulings and rationales in these contexts are far from uniform.146
After Houchins, the campaign for affirmative rights of access was
moribund. But just two years later, the Court took an extraordinary
step in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,147 holding that the
public and press have a First Amendment right to attend criminal

138. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976) (concluding that “[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising . . . .”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (“In a variety of
contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to ‘receive information and
ideas.’”) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). The principle was also
supported in a case prior to Lamont, 381 U.S. 301. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943) (“[The First Amendment] embraces the right to distribute literature . . . and
necessarily protects the right to receive it.”) (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
139. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
140. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
141. Saxbe, U.S. at 849–50 (1974); Pell, U.S. at 833 (1974). The Court in Pell also addressed
the special-rights question, holding that “newsmen have no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public.” Id. at 834.
142. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
143. Id. at 9.
144. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
145. Id. at 47.
146. Compare J.B. Pictures, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d. 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(upholding federal regulation excluding the press and public from the area of Dover Air Force
Base where bodies of dead soldiers are returned), with Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp.
465, 471 (D.N.H. 1990) (holding that a freelance photographer’s First Amendment rights were
violated by police order that he stop taking photos of an accident scene).
147. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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trials.148 The Court emphasized the fact that in Great Britain and the
United States, courtrooms have for centuries been open to the public
and that access serves vital democratic purposes. “People in an open
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,” the Court
held, “but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited
from observing.”149 Because criminal trials have historically been
open to the public, and because access helps ensure the fairness of
these proceedings, the Court concluded that they are presumptively
open.150 The Court in Richmond thus established an affirmative right
of access that was supported by two key rationales: history and
151
function.
Two years later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,152 the
Court struck down a law that peremptorily mandated closure of trials
in which minor victims of sexual assaults would be testifying.153 In
1984, the Court extended the presumption of access to the jury
selection process in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press
Enterprise I),154 holding that closure of voir dire would only be
constitutional if the closure order were “narrowly tailored” and
155
In 1986, the Court held that the
served an “overriding interest.”
presumption of access also applies to preliminary hearings in PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II),156 and that the
presumptive openness of judicial proceedings depends on the two
factors highlighted in Richmond: (1) whether the proceeding “ha[s]
historically been open to the press and general public,”157 and (2)
“whether public access plays a significant role in the functioning of

148. Id. at 580. There is only a presumptive right of access, however. The Court
acknowledged that there might be countervailing interests that are sufficiently compelling to
justify closure. Id. at 598.
149. Id. at 572.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court has also used the term “logic” instead of “function” to refer to this part
of the test. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct. for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982) (“In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and
experience.”) (emphasis added).
152. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596.
153. There may be times when privacy interests supersede access rights, the Court held, but
the presumption must be openness, and closure must only be permitted where the government
can demonstrate that it serves a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. Id. at 607–08.
154. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
155. Id. at 510.
156. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). This case actually involved a request for the transcript of a
preliminary hearing that had previously been closed. Id.
157. Id.
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the particular process in question.”158 If a proceeding is held to be
presumptively open, access can only be denied by satisfying the strictscrutiny test outlined in Press Enterprise II. 159
The presumption of access to most criminal proceedings has been
reinforced by dozens of lower-court decisions.160 But there is a
significant discrepancy in the way courts have applied the function
component of Richmond. The Court in Richmond held that judges
should look at whether the functioning of the proceeding in question
would be significantly aided by open access.161 The holding suggests
that, in some cases, access is essential to the proper administration of
justice, not merely because it enhances public understanding of the
courts and court proceedings, but also because it directly affects the
162
Some lower courts have
integrity of the proceedings themselves.
paid less attention to this aspect of Richmond and have required
public access largely because it enhances citizens’ knowledgeable
participation in civic life.163 The Supreme Court may have encouraged
this kind of interpretation by its own emphasis on this public benefit
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: “[B]y offering [access], the
First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of
158. Id.
159. Id. In its most recent court-access case, El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147
(1993), the Court added that when considering whether a proceeding has historically been open,
courts should not focus on the unique traditions of a particular jurisdiction but rather on
whether the type of proceeding has traditionally been open throughout the United States. Id. at
150.
160. Courts have declared a variety of criminal proceedings to be presumptively open. See,
e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557–58 (3d Cir. 1982) (suppression hearing); Seattle
Times v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988) (bail
hearings); State v. Eaton, 483 So.2d 651, 658–59 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (competency hearings);
CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) (a postconviction proceeding on a defendant’s motion for a reduction his sentence); Soc’y of Prof’l
Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 571 (D. Utah 1985) (administrative hearings).
Grand jury proceedings are the primary exception to the presumption of openness. See
generally In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864
F.2d 1559 (11th Cir. 1989).
161. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (“[Access] gave
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged
perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.”).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Cable News Network, Inc. v. Amer. Broad. Cos., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (“[T]he rights guaranteed and protected by the First Amendment include a
right of access to news or information concerning the operations and activities of government.
This right is held by both the general public and the press, with the press acting as a
representative or agent of the public as well as on its own behalf. Without such a right, the goals
and purposes of the First Amendment would be meaningless.”).
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self-government.”164 This is undoubtedly true, but if it is the chief
rationale upon which access is granted, there may be no principled
basis for denying access to any government information or
proceeding. As the Supreme Court noted in the 1965 case, Zemel v.
Rusk, “There are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow.”165
Although the Supreme Court and lower courts have correctly
provided access to most criminal and civil166 court proceedings, to the
extent that their rulings rely on the public-edification rationale
instead of one focused on procedural fairness, the courts read into the
First Amendment an anomalous right that is both impossible to
confine to the context of judicial proceedings and inconsistent with
the Court’s other First Amendment rulings that uniformly shape
rights by a negative construction.167 If the function component is
satisfied whenever access yields useful insights into government
processes and decision-making, it is hard to know what prevents
function from serving as an almost boundless mandate for direct
public supervision of all government operations.
Although journalists generally regard Richmond as one of the few
unmovable pillars of First Amendment law—as vital to their work as
Near v. Minnesota168 and New York Times v. Sullivan169—it is difficult to
square its affirmative-rights construction with the Court’s other First
164. 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982).
165. 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
166. The Court has not addressed the question of access in the context of a civil proceeding,
but it wrote in dicta in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.15 (1979), that access
claims in those cases might be “as strong [or] stronger” than in many criminal cases. Lower
courts have regularly provided access to most civil proceedings, except those that implicate
some overriding privacy interest—for example, cases involving divorce, custody, civil
commitment, and adoption.
167. The Court has interpreted the First Amendment as a negative barrier against
government encroachments or usurpations of the press’ editorial discretion, not as an
affirmative command to supply it with information or access. As Justice Potter Stewart
suggested, “The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official
Secrets Act.” Stewart, supra note 38, at 636. With the exception of the court access cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 146–156, the Court has consistently rejected interpretations of
the First Amendment that would put affirmative obligations on the government. See, e.g.,
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9–10, 14–16 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post. Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834–35 (1974); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966);
Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16 (1965).
168. 283 U.S. 697, 773, 735 (1931) (ruling that prior restraints of the press are presumptively
unconstitutional).
169. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (ruling that public-official libel plaintiffs have the burden to prove
that information published about them is false and that it was published with actual malice; that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity).
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Amendment rulings.170 That is not to say that access to the courts has
no constitutional basis. But those rights are better recognized as
components of procedural fairness guaranteed in other constitutional
171
172
provisions, particularly the Sixth, Seventh, and to a lesser extent,
173
Eighth Amendments.
By recognizing an affirmative First
Amendment right of access to the judiciary, the Court has muddied its
First Amendment jurisprudence and facilitated the disparate rulings
of lower courts. The Court was right to acknowledge that access has
edifying effects,174 but those are merely ancillary benefits of access, not
compelling reasons for providing it. What is a compelling rationale is
that the legitimacy of most judicial proceedings is in fact preserved by
access and undermined by its denial. This is not true, at least not in
the same way, in other contexts where access could be seen as
useful.175
The interpretation of the First Amendment proposed here does
not recognize affirmative rights. It does support public access to the
judiciary, but under the umbrella of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments, not the First. This is the only approach that can resolve
the incongruities spawned by Richmond and its progeny, and it is an
approach that finds support in most of the traditional theories of
constitutional interpretation, including the sequential approach
applied in Part III. The interpretation proposed here is also built
around a conception of affirmative rights that is different than the
one applied by the Court. The Court in Branzburg, Zurcher, Herbert,
and Cohen seems to construe the claims of the media litigants as
demands for special exemptions or immunities from the normal
obligations of citizenship while minimizing the potentially suppressive

170. See supra note 163.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence.”).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
174. See supra text accompanying note 160.
175. The presence of the public provides external oversight of judicial proceedings and
serves as a check against any mistakes or mischief that occurs there. Although some of the same
interests are served by access to the legislative process, the participants in those proceedings are
more readily held accountable through the electoral process.
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effects of government intrusions on journalists’ source relationships,
editorial decision-making, and newsroom privacy.176 It works from a
dichotomous framework in which direct restraints of expression are
presumptively unconstitutional, but restraints of newsgathering and
other behavior that are one step removed are, in most cases,
permissible.177 The Court gives too little consideration to contextual
issues in the application of generally applicable laws, and does not
recognize or acknowledge that neutral laws can still breach the press’
autonomy and produce the same kinds of effects as content-based
178
laws. The interpretation proposed here would realign those cases by
applying a negative-rights construction of the First Amendment, but
one that recognizes a negative right as protection against restrictions
both on expressive activity and journalistic autonomy.
II. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Before charting the dimensions of a right to gather news, one must
identify some constitutional language from which the right can be said
to originate. Some say the First Amendment generally supports
recognition of a right to gather news.179 Others, most notably Justice
Potter Stewart, argue that those protections derive specifically from
180
the Press Clause. Others insist that the Press and Speech Clauses
are to be read together as a collective statement about the right of

176. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (“The sole issue before us is the
obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do.”); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155 (1979) (“[W]e are urged to hold for the first time that when a member
of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the
plaintiff's reputation, the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial processes of those
responsible for the publication.”); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991)
(“[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news.”). See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (failing to address the First
Amendment implications of newsroom searches).
177. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Newhouse Dedication Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173,
176 (1979) (describing the Court’s two-track approach to evaluating speech and press
controversies).
178. For example, the excessive use of subpoenas and newsroom searches, even though
issued or conducted pursuant to a neutral law, could produce the same kind of “chilling effect”
that the Court has emphasized in other First Amendment cases. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 300 (1964).
179. See, e.g., Branzbug, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”).
180. Stewart, supra note 38, at 633–34 (1975) (arguing that the Press Clause is a “structural
provision” that protects “the institutional autonomy of the press”).
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citizens to express themselves, whether through speech or through
media.181
These interpretive battles might have been unnecessary if not for
James Madison’s verbal economy. The Speech and Press Clauses,
about which millions of words have been written, consist of only
182
fourteen. But because their meaning is not self-evident, it can only
be said that the clauses protect certain behaviors and not others by
offering some theory of constitutional interpretation to support that
conclusion. The sequential approach outlined here relies upon several
familiar sources when interpreting constitutional provisions—text,
history, structure, and context—all of which are necessary, but none is
sufficient. These sources are briefly described below and specifically
applied to the First Amendment in Part III.
A. Analysis of Text
Text-focused approaches to judicial review seek answers to
constitutional questions from the plain language of the Constitution.183
Although the text provides clear answers to some constitutional
questions—How old must someone be to run for president?184 How
185
many years is each presidential term? —most provisions require
some extrapolation. Phrases like “equal protection,” “due process,”
and “the press” force even the most determined textualists to look
beyond the document for guidance.186

181. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (dismissing the
notion of a separate meaning for the Press Clause and arguing that the press merited separate
mention by the Framers merely because “it had been more often the object of official
restraints”).
182. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.”).
183. See, e.g., Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a Politicized Judiciary: A
Philosophical Critique, 8 J.L. SOC’Y 114 (2007) (“[T]extualism limits legal interpretation (where
possible) to literal linguistic constraints.”). Justice Hugo Black declared himself to be a First
Amendment absolutist, because he read that amendment as a literal prohibition of all restraints
of individual expression. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“I read ‘no law . . . abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”). Note, however, that
Justice Black was willing to tolerate restraints of free expression when they were coupled with
some kind of conduct. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 516 (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing against recognition of the speech rights of high school students who wore black
armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War).
184. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
185. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
186. Justice Black, for example, who advocated a literal reading of the words of the
Constitution as a way of concretizing and stabilizing its meaning and removing the discretion of
judges to promote their own creative translations, was nevertheless overzealous in his claim to
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Justice Hugo Black was perhaps the most celebrated textualist.
He began serving on the Court during the ascendancy of judicial
realism,187 a philosophy that he viewed as an assault on the legitimacy
188
of the judiciary. Justice Black sought to restore some precision and
neutrality to constitutional interpretation. To this end, he argued that
the Constitution is fundamentally a statement against excessive
189
government intrusions into private domains, and that it was
designed very deliberately to proclaim certain absolutes—or “thou
shalt nots,” as Justice Black called them190—in circumscribing
government. Justice Black eschewed balancing formulas like the
191
“clear and present danger test” that were too malleable in the hands
of undisciplined judges. Instead, he favored a more literal reading of
the Constitution that put clear and immovable barriers at the feet of
government officials. Justice Black believed that this would better
protect individual autonomy, provide greater consistency, and make
the law, particularly the Constitution, understandable to all citizens.192
By limiting judicial discretion, textualism minimizes what
Alexander Bickel called the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”—the
“merely [be] enforcing the plain meaning of plain words and [the] agreed-upon intent of the
Framers.” Sylvia Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, in JUSTICE BLACK AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 18 (Everette E. Dennis, Donald M. Gillmor & David L. Grey eds., Iowa State
Univ. Press 1978). As Snowiss points out, the very fact that there was, and remains, widespread
disagreement about the plain meaning of many of these constitutional passages suggests that
Justice Black’s claims about their certainty were overstated, whether or not they were
disingenuous. Id. at 17.
187. Underlying realism was the belief that judicial decision-making is inherently subjective,
political and personal, and that there is no way to purify constitutional interpretation from the
contaminating influence of judicial discretion.
188. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384–85 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“It can be . .
. argued that when this Court strikes down a legislative act because it offends the idea of
‘fundamental fairness,’ it furthers the basic thrust of our Bill or Rights . . . . But that argument
ignores the effect of such decisions on perhaps the most fundamental individual liberty of our
people—the right of each man to participate in the self-government of his society.”).
189. Edmond N. Cahn, Dimensions of First Amendment ‘Absolutes’: A Public Interview, in
JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 41, 46 (Everette E. Dennis, Donald M.
Gillmor & David L. Grey eds., Iowa State Univ. Press 1978) (“Why was a Constitution written
for the first time in this country except to limit the power of government and those who were
selected to exercise it at the moment?”).
190. Id. at 51.
191. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that government
restrictions of speech are unconstitutional unless the “words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”).
192. See Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court
Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 198 (2002) (“As a self-conscious stylist, Black wanted
his prose to be accessible to ordinary people because he wanted them to understand and
appreciate for themselves the legal protections the Constitution provided.”).
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seeming incongruity of judges being empowered to override the will
of the majority, as expressed by Congress.193 But textualism presents
other problems. The Constitution’s text is rarely clear, and its
194
meaning can change over time. What is “cruel and unusual” in one
century might be perfectly ordinary in another, for example. Without
some accommodation for the evolution of human experience, a literal
interpretation of the Constitution would bind society to a set of
definitions and values that have, in some cases, become archaic.
Literalist interpretations also risk undermining the intent of the
Framers. The Seventh Amendment, for example, preserves the right
to a jury trial for common law suits, but only when the “value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.”195 A literal interpretation
that did not account for inflation would destroy that monetary
limitation and defeat the original purpose of the provision. The text,
then, is the necessary starting point in constitutional interpretation,
but an unadulterated textual analysis does not account for conflicts
between text and intent and does not permit the Constitution to
evolve in the face of new circumstances.
B. Analysis of Intent
Historical approaches to constitutional interpretation focus on the
intent of the Constitution’s Framers, ratifiers, or both. Strict
historicists—also commonly referred to as originalists or
intentionalists—believe judges should ascertain what the Framers
196
intended each specific phrase of the Constitution to mean.
Moderate historicists are less interested in the contextual meaning of
words and phrases and more interested in the Framers’ broader
aims.197
Historical approaches have intuitive appeal. It seems self-evident
that if the Constitution is the supreme law and the ultimate

193. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (Yale University Press 2d
ed. 1986) (1962).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
196. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18–23, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying
on historical understandings of “cruel and unusual” to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
only prohibits corporal punishments of prisoners that cause “serious injury”).
197. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”). Here, the Court is concerned with intent but is focused on identifying the underlying
principal and not ascertaining the contextual meaning of the words.
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expression of the public will, it should be given the meaning intended
by those who adopted it. Yet historicists must inevitably confront the
problems that accompany all historical inquiry. Can an objective
rendering of past eras ever be constructed—particularly for a period
whose historiography is so steeped in patriotic sentiment and greatperson mythos?198 And can one discern the meaning of the
Constitution or the intent of those who drafted and ratified it when
there were so many participants and when the debate took place over
so many years? As constitutional historian Jack Rakove observes, the
framing and ratifying of the Constitution “involved processes of
collective decision-making whose outcomes necessarily reflected a
bewildering array of intentions and expectations, hopes and fears,
199
genuine compromises and agreements to disagree.”
Critics of historicism also suggest that its adherents either näively
suppose or disingenuously contend that it is an apolitical, value200
They argue instead that because
neutral interpretive method.
people are naturally drawn to historical sources that are most
compatible with individual viewpoints, and because people examine
and perceive empirical evidence through their own peculiar lenses,
portrayals of intent will always be imperfect.201 Historicism’s critics
also ask why contemporary Americans should be beholden to the
intentions of their long-deceased forbearers who, by virtue of being

198. The Great Person or Great Man approach to historical study focuses on the heroic and
nefarious acts of individuals as the keys to understanding past eras. This approach is seen by
many contemporary historians as a failing of modern historiography—it is so tightly trained on
individuals that it misses the more diffuse social forces that shaped particular events or periods.
The traditional works examining the Revolutionary era, for example, are often criticized for
their preoccupation with the founders—Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, and the like.
See HOWARD ZINN, Forward to RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (Perennial 2002) (arguing that this approach serves “the interests of the
privileged and powerful, because, by ignoring ordinary people, it reinforces their feelings of
powerlessness”).
199. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 6 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1996).
200. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 558 (2006) (“As a political practice, originalism
has been nothing if not practical. It has engaged in a perfectly ordinary effort to identify and
appropriate a politically useable past by strategically selecting and resurrecting particular
historical themes and events. It has ignored elements of the original understanding that do not
resonate with contemporary conservative commitments.”).
201. See, e.g., Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST.
& THEORY 3, 6 (1969) (“[T]hese models and preconceptions in terms of which we unavoidably
organize and adjust our perceptions and thoughts will themselves tend to act as determinants of
what we think or perceive. We must classify in order to understand, and we can only classify the
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar.”).
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dead, are no longer stakeholders in American democracy.202 Noninterpretivists203—those who espouse approaches that go beyond both
history and intent—argue that historicism is in fact a status quo
reinforcing approach that turns the Constitution into a static
anachronism.204 The Constitution should be a living document, and to
strictly adhere to the meanings intended by those who drafted and
ratified it two centuries ago disempowers those who must abide by it
today.205
All of these are sound arguments, which is why historicist and
interpretivist theories can never be relied upon exclusively. But intent
cannot be dismissed. To do so is to undermine through judicial
interpretation what the citizens of 1791 established through
constitutional amendment. And if their intent is not respected, it
enfeebles both the amendment process and the larger democratic
architecture. The complexities that accompany these kinds of
inquiries are inadequate reasons to abandon them. This does not
mean that the intent of the Framers with respect to discrete
constitutional passages can ever be understood with mathematical
precision. But it is possible, particularly in the context of the First
Amendment, to understand more general sentiments and to identify
206
and exclude the most specious interpretations.
C. Analysis of Structure
When clear meanings cannot be gleaned from text, intent, or both,
some insights can be found in the broader design or structure of the

202. See infra note 205.
203. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975). Grey distinguishes the “interpretive” model of constitutional interpretation—in which
judges abide by the clear dictates of the text, animated by original intent—from the
“noninterpretive model,” in which a court has an “additional role as the expounder of basic
national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is
not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution.” Id. at 706.
204. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2005).
205. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Transcript of the University of Hawaii Law Review
Symposium: Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 501, 507 (2000) (“I am
skeptical of original meaning because it assumes that the world when the Constitution was
adopted, is the world that should govern us today. We live in a vastly different world, obviously,
than in 1787 or in 1791, or 1867.”).
206. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 422 (1985) (“That I am
unsure whether rafts and floating motorized automobiles are ‘boats’ does not dispel my
confidence that rowboats and dories most clearly are boats, and that steam locomotives,
hamburgers, and elephants equally clearly are not.”).
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Constitution. Structural analysis requires judges to engage in a more
holistic reading of the Constitution and to situate their interpretations
of individual passages within more macro-level analyses of the entire
document. Analysis of some constitutional provisions can be more
precisely understood when interpreted in light of, or in conjunction
with, the rest of the Constitution’s language.
Structural analysis is a four-corners approach that looks for
meaning from within the document and not from extrinsic sources. It
should be differentiated, however, from the kind of structuralism
described by some constitutional scholars, which focuses on the
broader systems established by the Constitution and the relationships
it creates between the branches and between the federal and state
governments.207 The structural analysis applied here is more focused
on the organization and composition of the document, and what it
says about the role of government vis-à-vis the individual and about
the Constitution’s animating values and principles. It is more akin,
then, to what Philip Bobbitt describes as ethical analysis.208 Bobbitt
argues, much like Justice Black,209 that the Constitution provides a
template for a political system based on maximum freedom,
210
The Constitution’s text and
autonomy, and limited government.
design provide a “constitutional motif” that should be applied when
211
analyzing claims of both new and old rights. Bobbitt argues that the
“constitutional grammar” has already been provided “so that once
heard we can supply the rest on our own,” which includes recognizing
new rights not explicitly stated in the text.212
The claim of a constitutional right of privacy, for example, can be
recognized not merely because it provides protections that some
believe desirable, but because the right can be logically inferred from
213
Recognizing additional rights from
the existing cadence of rights.
time to time, when consistent with the original constitutional
structure, is not only warranted but was anticipated by the Founders.

207. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 74–92 (1982).
208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 187–188.
210. BOBBITT, supra note 207, at 101.
211. Id. at 177.
212. Id.
213. For Bobbitt, a case like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), requires no
sleight-of-hand. Quite simply, the use of birth control is not the business of the state, and to
regulate it would upset the “ethos of limited government” that the whole Constitution
enshrines.
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James Madison was one of many Framers reluctant to enumerate
rights in the Constitution for fear that future generations would
assume the list was exhaustive.214 Bobbitt argues that “to some extent
the fears of Madison and others . . . have been fulfilled. Insofar as we
treat the Bill of Rights as the sole source . . . of constitutional rights,
we are contributing to the realization of the Framers’ misgivings.”215
Another obvious structural feature of the Constitution is its
emphasis on equality. This emphasis is reflected explicitly in the
Preamble and in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause, as well as in the Privilege and Immunities Clauses of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.216 Equality is also reflected
implicitly by the absence of provisions that elevate one group’s
217
protections over another’s and by the universal language used in
elucidating the rights in the first eight amendments. This emphasis on
equality provides courts with useful guidance in assessing the
constitutionality of government acts that discriminate against
particular groups. For example, the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause does not contain an equal protection statement akin to the
one found in the Fourteenth Amendment.218 Theoretically, then, the
Constitution does not explicitly limit discriminatory acts by the
federal government. But the ethos of equality suggests that there is
an implicit limitation on all discrimination. The Supreme Court has
applied this principle in several cases, including Bolling v. Sharpe, in
which it struck down public school segregation in the District of
Columbia, noting that “the concepts of equal protection and due
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive.”219 The Court’s analysis in Bolling was at least
partly structural in that it made some reasonable deductions from the
214. See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8
(1988). Madison ultimately relented, but he later introduced into Congress what would become
the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 1–2.
215. BOBBITT, supra note 207, at 176.
216. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (“We hold these Truths to be self
evident, that all Men are created equal.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
217. The obvious exception, however, is the Constitution’s tacit recognition of the
institution of slavery. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cls. 2–3.
218. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
219. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (emphasis added). The Court held that due process includes
an implicit guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 499–500.
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Constitution’s text without leaning on extrinsic sources.220 Structural
characteristics, particularly those of autonomy and equality, are
especially useful in charting the dimensions of the First Amendment
and the right to gather news.
D. Analysis of Context
Whether it is true that the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution support recognition of a particular right, no approach to
constitutional
interpretation
is
tenable
without
some
acknowledgement of contemporary conditions and societal evolution.
This is necessary not only to properly apply rights that have already
221
been recognized, but also on rare occasions to recognize new ones.
As the Court has noted, some rights cannot be meaningfully applied
without an accounting of shifting social conditions and new
technology.222 The Court must extrapolate from time to time in order
to sustain the Constitution’s relevance to successive generations. As
Ronald Dworkin puts it, the Framers have merely enunciated a series
of concepts to which individuals must apply their own conceptions.223
In applying the sequential approach to interpreting the First
Amendment, then, a right might still be cognizable—even if it is not
explicitly protected by the text, nor implicitly protected by references
to the Framers’ intent or the Constitution’s broader ethos—provided
it is either (1) indispensable to the exercise of other clearly protected
rights, or (2) so culturally embedded that refusing recognition would
subvert a widely recognized dimension of liberty.224 The Supreme
220. The Court essentially concluded that equal protection is merely a more specific
expression of due process, which is merely one dimension of liberty. Id. at 499. So, although
the Court resolved this as a Fifth Amendment due process case, its decision may have been
made easier by the existence of the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
221. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (recognizing a
constitutional right to privacy).
222. Because print media were the only ones known to the Framers, a strict historicist
interpretation of the First Amendment would preclude protections for communication via
broadcast, cable, internet and wireless media, among others. The Supreme Court has never
taken this view and has extended constitutional protection to various media, focusing primarily
on their communicative function, rather than on the means by which they accomplish it. See,
e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) (“Cable television provides to its subscribers
news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in ‘speech’ under the First Amendment,
and is, in much of its operation, part of the ‘press.’”).
223. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1988).
224. The Ninth Amendment provides one constitutional hook for recognition of these types
of rights. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). In most cases, the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which respectively protect people
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Court has endorsed the former idea in a number of cases, most
notably Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.225 The latter idea is more
nebulous, and interpretivists would no doubt deride it as a usurpation
of congressional prerogatives or an invitation for judicial
embellishments. The risk of overreaching here is certainly real, but to
foreclose recognition of non-enumerated rights would betray the
226
intent of those who drafted and ratified the Ninth Amendment.
Identifying what constitutes a culturally embedded right is an
unavoidably hazardous exercise, but one that the courts have engaged
in many times. The courts have recognized the right of criminal
defendants to be presumed innocent, for example, even though the
227
The Supreme Court has
Constitution does not mention it.
recognized a constitutional right to travel, both as a necessary precondition for the enjoyment of certain privileges228 and as an essential
component of individual freedom.229 And certainly all courts would
have been justified in recognizing a constitutional right for AfricanAmericans and women to vote, even before ratification of the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. These are the kinds of
against deprivations of their liberty by federal and state governments, are better sources. See
U.S. CONST. amends. V, IV.
225. 448 U.S. 555, 579–80 (1980) (“But arguments such as the State makes have not
precluded recognition of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate
caution against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has
acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees. For
example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the
right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well
as the right to travel, appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important
but unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in
common with explicit guarantees. The concerns expressed by Madison and others have thus
been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized
by the Court as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.”).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
227. The Fifth Amendment requires indictment by grand jury for capital crimes, U.S.
CONST. amend. V, and the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to a speedy and public
trial, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, but neither makes clear whether guilt or innocence is to be
presumed nor what evidentiary standard must be applied. Nevertheless, the Court has held that
“[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976).
228. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) (striking down state law
imposing one-year residency requirement for receipt of welfare benefits).
229. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1958) (“The right to travel is a part of the
‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment . . . . Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers
as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be . . . as
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”).
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judgments courts must make, at least where the underlying activity
involves matters of profound societal expectation that are, as the
Supreme Court put it, “basic in our scheme of values.”230
III. SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS AND THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS
This section applies the elements of the sequential analysis
described in Part II to the Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment to consider what each suggests about the existence and
dimensions of newsgathering rights. In identifying the core principles
underlying the First Amendment, this section pays special attention to
the key questions raised earlier regarding affirmative rights, special
rights and the definition of “journalist” and “the press.”231
A. Newsgathering and Text
Because the rights outlined in the First Amendment are so
concisely stated and the language so encompassing, it is impossible to
define the limits of freedom of the press by reference to the text
alone. But all constitutional analysis must begin with the text,232 and
in the case of the First Amendment, the text provides some insights.
The First Amendment reads “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”233 It does not
read “speech and press,” as if to suggest a single concept, or even
“speech or press.” It says “of speech, or of the press,” which is a more
starkly disjunctive wording and suggests, however subtly, a calculated
separation. The use of the word “the” before “press” could even be
significant. By referring to “the press,” perhaps the Framers were
referring to a distinct institution. This interpretation would lend
support to Justice Stewart’s proposition that the Framers intended the

230. Id. at 126.
231. See supra Part I.
232. See Schauer, supra note 206, at 431 (“An interpretation is legitimate (which is not the
same as correct) only insofar as it purports to interpret some language of the document, and
only insofar as the interpretation is within the boundaries at least suggested by that language.”).
The Supreme Court has made some references to this idea in the constitutional context, see,
e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 260 (“It is useful to begin with the text of
Article III.”), and it is an interpretive canon in the statutory context, see, e.g., Limtiaco v.
Camacho, 127 S. Ct. 1413, 1418 (2007) (“As always, we begin with the text of the statute.”).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
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press to have a unique constitutional status and that the Press Clause
should be interpreted apart from the Speech Clause.234
There is some support for that view. At the time the Bill of Rights
was ratified, nine states had already provided state constitutional
protection for press freedom while only one did the same for
235
speech. Does this indicate a desire by the states to provide unique
protection for the press? The 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights
236
refers to the press as “the greatest bulwark of liberty,” and the 1780
Massachusetts Constitution states that “liberty of the press is essential
237
These phrases imply that the press
to the security of the state.”
serves some instrumental purpose—checking government and
thereby preserving other freedoms—and perhaps that it should be
protected because of those functions. James Madison used similar
language in his initial draft of the First Amendment: “The people shall
not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the
great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”238 This phrasing suggests
even more concretely that an individual right of expression exists
apart from the liberty of the press. Furthermore, the press has a
specific role to play—to serve as a bulwark of liberty, presumably by
acting as a government watchdog. The rights of “the people” are
presented as natural rights, while the rights of the press are more
instrumental. The separation between the two is emphasized by
Madison’s use of a semicolon.
It is clear that those who drafted these constitutions viewed the
press as serving a special role, but that does not necessarily mean they
had in mind a special set of protections for printers or publishers. It is
possible that they anticipated that anyone could serve a press
function—at least anyone with access to a printing press. The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which protected both speech and
press, reads: “‘That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and
of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of

234. Stewart, supra note 38, at 631.
235. Anderson, supra note 38, at 464–65.
236. Id. at 464. This language is borrowed from Cato’s Letters. Id. at 463 (citing LEONARD
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 68–69 (1960)). Similar language was used in the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of
Rights. Id. at 463–64.
237. Id. at 465. Similar language was used in the 1783 New Hampshire Bill of Rights. Id.
238. Id. at 478 (quoting 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 690 (1789)).
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the press ought not to be restrained.’”239 Here the emphasis is not so
much on the instrumental role of the press, but on the natural right of
all people to express themselves freely in any medium. Rights of
expression, whether through speech or printed words, reside with the
individual and should be protected for reasons other than their social
benefits. On this view, freedom of the press is simply an extension of
freedom of speech. It is not so much a distinct institution as it is
simply a unique medium through which ideas can be delivered to an
audience.
Historian Leonard Levy argues that the common understanding at
the time of ratification was that freedom of speech and freedom of
the press were thought of interchangeably.240 The fact that nine states
had protections for a free press supports Levy’s thesis, according to
Melville Nimmer, because it would be senseless to protect freedom of
the press and not freedom of speech.241 That the First Amendment
contains references to both speech and press does not necessarily
imply a two-tiered set of rights, at least according to Levy and
Nimmer.242 Perhaps the emphasis on the press was simply to
recognize that the press was the principal venue for government
criticism; it had undeniable social and political power, and the press—
not unmediated speech—had been the primary target of punishment
during the preceding century. Because many of the Framers were also
regular contributors to publications,243 they might have simply been
declaring that the right to free expression reached both the
contributor and the publisher.
After John Adams was selected to draft the Massachusetts
Constitution, he included provisions protecting “freedom of speaking”
244
This language parallels the First
and “liberty of the press.”
Amendment, and it too can be interpreted several ways. On one
hand, the separation of these two phrases suggests that they may not
be interchangeable. On the other hand, it is unclear whether Adams
had in mind a separate set of constitutional protections for the press
as an institution.

239. Id. at 465 (quoting I.B. SCHWARTZ, 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 266 (1971)).
240. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 183–85 (1985).
241. See Nimmer, supra note 38, at 639–41.
242. See id.; LEVY, supra note 240, at 183–85.
243. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 309–315.
244. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 221 (2001).
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The text of the First Amendment does not yield definitive
answers, even when looking to parallel provisions in state
constitutions. What is certain is that the Framers intended to protect
the freedom of all citizens to publicly express ideas regardless of
medium. Most of the evidence also suggests that the Framers
recognized that the press played a unique role in society.245 It served
as a “bulwark of liberty” that provided a check on those in power.
Several questions remain, however. First, does the press serve the
bulwark-of-liberty function merely by providing a vehicle for political
dialogue and criticism of government, or did the Framers anticipate a
more active press role? Second, even though the Framers clearly
recognized a unique role for the press, did they intend to endow the
institution or its practitioners with a special set of rights? Third,
whom did the Framers see as the press? As another provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution reads: “The printing presses shall be free to
every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the
legislature, or any part of the government.”246 In this example, the
press seems almost incidental—it is not an institution; it has no
character, identity, or spirit. It is merely a useful technology,
employable by “every person” who seeks to act as a bulwark of
liberty.
Although revealing in some ways, the text of the First Amendment
is sufficiently ambiguous that its meaning cannot be deduced without
paying attention to the next step in the sequence: intent. As David
Anderson explains, “[T]ext and meaning ultimately are inseparable; to
understand what the Framers said, we inevitably seek to understand
what they meant.”247
B. Newsgathering and Intent
Although freedom of the press is a central feature of American
democracy, the Supreme Court did not decide a case involving the
press until 1931—almost a century and a half after the First
Amendment was ratified.248 The Press Clause laid dormant for 140
245. Indeed, most state constitutions prior to the ratification of the Constitution contained
provisions protecting freedom of the press. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 464–66.
246. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
247. Anderson, supra note 38, at 462.
248. One reason for this was that the Supreme Court had held in earlier decisions that the
Bill of Rights did not apply against state governments. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
460 (1907); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (1 How.) 410, 434 (1847); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (1 Pet.)
540, 582 (1840).
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years before the Supreme Court, in Near v. Minnesota, struck down an
injunction against a muckraking newspaper publisher.249 In so doing,
the Court breathed life into the Press Clause250 and affirmed the
principle that prior restraints on the press are presumptively
251
unconstitutional. In addition, Near was the first case in which the
Supreme Court held that state governments have no more discretion
than the federal government to restrict citizens’ freedom of speech or
press.252
To many, including scholar Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Near was merely
the first step in a long process of charting the boundaries of press
253
freedom. But to others, Near was both the beginning and the end of
free-press jurisprudence.254 These individuals pointed to the work of
historian Leonard W. Levy, which sought to debunk the “received
hypothesis” that the First Amendment was designed to provide
sweeping protection against restraints on expression, including
subsequent punishments.255
Levy made four key points in his work, Legacy of Suppression.
First, the libertarian philosophy of press freedom that had been
advanced by Chafee, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice Louis
Brandeis, Justice Hugo Black, and others did not reflect the view of

249. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931).
250. Although some previous cases dealt with material that was printed, see, e.g., Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (pamphlets); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(mailed documents)—Near was the first case involving a traditional mass medium. It was also
the first in which the Court addressed the meaning of the Press Clause, and the first in which the
Court struck down as unconstitutional a government action restricting the press.
251. The Court conceded that there might be rare situations in which a prior restraint would
be constitutional. Restrictions of obscene speech, speech that incites violence or speech that
poses an immediate threat to national security might justify the use of a prior restraint. Near,
283 U.S. at 716.
252. Id. at 707. This was the first manifestation of the “incorporation doctrine.” The Court
held that because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from restricting “life, liberty and
property,” and because freedom of speech and press are among people’s core liberties, the
states have no more latitude to restrict those rights than does the federal government.
253. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 381 (1948). Chafee
argued that freedom of the press meant much more than freedom from prior restraints. He
attacked laws aimed at sedition and others that he thought contradicted the broad aims of the
First Amendment.
254. Indeed, the Court reinforced this view in Near by noting that there was nothing to
prevent aggrieved readers from bringing a suit for libel against Jay Near or others like him.
Near, 283 U.S. at 628.
255. LEVY, supra note 236, at 309.
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those who framed and ratified the First Amendment.256 Levy argued
that a libertarian view of press freedom did not emerge until the early
1800s in the wake of prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798.257
Second, the Framers did not intend to eliminate the law of seditious
libel or the traditional conception of press freedom as defined by Sir
William Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.258
Blackstone wrote: “‘The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
259
Levy argues that the First Amendment
matter when published.’”
was designed to be nothing more than a codification of this
principle.260 Third, although prosecutions for seditious libel prior to
the revolution were rare, colonial legislatures punished speech more
repressively and more frequently than previous scholars had
acknowledged.261 Finally, according to Levy, the First Amendment was
not penned to satisfy a deeply felt public concern for freedom of the
press but was, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, merely “a lucky
political accident.”262
Levy’s alternative thesis of the First Amendment provoked
widespread criticism.263 Some of it was not aimed at the strength of
his scholarship, but at its practical consequences for the cause of press
264
Indeed, the “received hypothesis,” whether credible or
freedom.

256. Id. at 214–15 (“Freedom of the press was everywhere a grand topic for declamation,
but the insistent demand for its protection on parchment was not accompanied by a reasoned
analysis of what it meant . . . .”).
257. Id. at 258 (citing Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired)).
258. LEVY, supra note 240, at 245–48.
259. See id. at 12 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 151–52 (emphasis added)).
260. LEVY, supra note 240, at 309 (criticizing the early advocates of the libertarian view of
falling victim to the “Anglo-American habit of going forward while facing backwards: rights that
should exist are established on the fictitious pretense that they have ever existed”).
261. Levy argued that, because many of the same legislators who were meting out
punishments against colonial publishers were the same ones who debated and ratified the Bill of
Rights, we should not assume that their conceptions of press freedom were any more expansive
than the Blackstonian position. Id. at vii–viii.
262. LEVY, supra note 240, at xii Levy argues that the absence of a Bill of Rights was first
trumpeted by the Anti-federalists who used it as a smokescreen to undermine support for the
new Constitution. After it was passed, it was used by the Federalists to pander to public opinion
and allay fears about excessive federal power.
263. See, e.g., James Morton Smith, Legacy of Suppression, 20 WM. & MARY Q. 156 (1963)
(book review).
264. Levy says his work “appalled some liberals” and that his critics feared that his work
would be used as a justification for rescinding many of the protections the courts and
legislatures had conferred on the press in the preceding decades. LEVY, supra note 240, at xvii.
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not, was working just fine as a foundation for favorable court
rulings.265 But the critique of Levy’s work was more substantial than
the mere sour-grapes protests of press advocates. Levy himself
retreated from some of his key propositions, writing a revised version
of Legacy twenty-three years later, titled Emergence of a Free Press.266
In this follow-up, Levy stood by many of his earlier conclusions but
admitted he was wrong to contend that the “American experience
with freedom of political expression was as slight as the conceptual
and legal understanding was narrow.”267 Levy was so focused on the
law of the press—which, among other things, permitted prosecutions
for sedition—that he underappreciated the actual practices of the
press, which he said “operated as if the law of seditious libel did not
268
The press “scorchingly” and “contemptuously” ridiculed
exist.”
public officials, he said, and routinely filled their papers with calumny
and rumor.269 Jeffrey Smith remarked that, “No governmental
institution, political faction, or individual was free from attacks such
270
The brazen,
as few newspapers today would dare to print.”
outrageous, and fiercely partisan press of the time was in practice as
271
free as it had ever been, and perhaps as free as it ever would be.

He also notes that Justice Hugo Black, whom Levy says was “innocent of history when he did
not distort it or invent it” wrote in a letter to a friend that Legacy was “probably one of the most
devastating blows that has been delivered against civil liberty in America for a long time.” Id. at
xviii.
265. Between the Court’s 1931 ruling in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) and the 1960
publication of Legacy of Suppression, the libertarian view of the First Amendment had begun
its ascendancy and it was beginning to find expression in the opinions of the Court. See, e.g.,
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (extending First Amendment protection to motion
pictures); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (narrowing the “fighting words” exception
to the First Amendment); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking
down a flag-salute statute as a violation of the First Amendment); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down a tax law that imposed special burdens on the press). All of
these were precursors to the most important catalyst for libertarian press theory. N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring public officials suing for libel to prove the
defendant acted with actual malice and rejecting the legitimacy of seditious libel).
266. LEVY, supra note 240, at x–xi.
267. Id. at x.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM 5 (1988) (quoting Merrill Jenson,
Legacy of Suppression, 75 HARV. L. REV. 456, 457 (1961) (book review)).
271. We might like to think the press today operates with greater freedom than it did two
centuries ago, but when one considers the burdens imposed on the modern media by civil suits
for libel, privacy, and other torts, as well as the regular issuances of subpoenas, a case could be
made that the media today are less free—or at least they behave less freely—than the press of
the Revolutionary period.
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It is true, however, that during the Revolutionary period the Tory
or loyalist presses were regularly attacked (verbally and physically),
which led Levy to ask “whether there was free speech during the
272
Revolutionary era if only the speech of freedom was free.” But this
statement should only temper and not obscure the undeniable fact
that the press of the Revolutionary period was “uninhibited, robust
273
and wide-open.” And it is implausible that the Framers’ vision of
the future included a press with less freedom than the press they
knew. The notion that the Framers viewed the First Amendment
exclusively as a barrier against the imposition of prior restraints is
specious, because prior restraints had all but vanished in the colonies
after the end of press licensing in the 1720s.274 Why would the
principal concern of the Framers have been the protection of a right
that had not been restricted for more than seventy years?275
It is also false, or at least an overstatement, to suggest as Levy did
that no libertarian press ideology had evolved by the time of the First
Amendment’s ratification, as it had in England, and that the Framers
therefore did not have a well-conceived notion of the meaning of
freedom of the press. Levy observed that there were only two
significant sources of libertarian press ideology during the colonial
and Revolutionary periods. The first was the argument of lawyer
Andrew Hamilton in his defense of Printer John Peter Zenger, who
276
had been charged with seditious libel in 1735. Zenger was acquitted
by a jury that audaciously defied the judge’s explicit instructions.277
The second was the widespread publication of John Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon’s essay “On Freedom of Speech”—one of the essays

272. LEVY, supra note 240, at xii.
273. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). This phrase comes from Justice
Brennan’s opinion for the court in which, in dicta, he rejected the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act, saying, “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon
its validity has carried the day in the court of history.” Id. at 276 (internal citations omitted).
274. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 36–37, 49.
275. Levy later conceded this point, noting that “freedom of the press merely began with its
immunity from previous restraints.” LEVY, supra note 240, at xi (emphasis added).
276. See LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 43–
62 (1966). For a more comprehensive account of the case, see VINCENT BURANELLI, THE
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (1957).
277. See Nathan Seth Chapman, Note, Punishment by the People: Rethinking the Jury’s
Political Role in Assigning Punitive Damages, 56 DUKE L.J. 1119, 1128 (2007) (noting that
despite the judge’s instruction to only consider the factual question of whether or not Zenger
published the allegedly libelous material, and to not consider its legality, the jury acquitted
Zenger in what was an historic act of jury nullification).

04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC

2008]

DEMARCATING THE RIGHT TO GATHER NEWS

7/23/2008 9:34:02 AM

163

collectively known as Cato’s Letters.278 The absence of other examples
led Levy to conclude that freedom of expression must not have been
a serious concern of the Framers and their contemporaries.279
But Cato and Zenger had more than momentary significance. The
bold actions of the jury in the Zenger trial, as well as Hamilton’s
arguments in that case, became part of the Revolutionary folklore.280
Though Zenger’s case did not change the law of libel, it provided a
catalyzing example of a subversive spirit and helped fortify the press’
efforts to monitor colonial overseers.281 Cato’s Letters, a collection of
radical Whig essays first published in the colonies by Benjamin
282
Those essays were
Franklin in 1722, were even more influential.
excerpted in hundreds of publications and were quoted ad nauseam
283
Cato’s Letters were part of the ideological
by patriot leaders.
backbone of the Revolution, and the essay on freedom of speech was
the most venerated statement of the eighteenth century on the liberty
of the press.284 Its “bulwark of liberty” language became the printer’s
mantra and those words were incorporated into several state
constitutions as well as Madison’s initial draft of the First
Amendment.285 So, even if few other prominent sources of libertarian
press ideology existed during this period, they were hardly necessary.

278. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is
Inseparable from Public Liberty, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND
RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 86 (1733) (“Freedom of speech is the great
bulwark of liberty; they prosper and die together.”).
279. See LEVY, supra note 240.
280. Levy acknowledges that James Alexander’s account of the trial, “A Brief Narrative of
the Case and Tryal [sic] of John Peter Zenger,” was, “with the possible exception of Cato’s
Letters, the most widely known source of libertarian thought in England and America during
the eighteenth century.” LEVY, supra note 240, at 130.
281. See MICHAEL EMERY ET AL., THE PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
OF THE MASS MEDIA 40 (2000) (noting that even though the Zenger case did not change the
law of libel, it enunciated the principle that the people have the right to criticize their governors
and that it is perhaps no coincidence that there is no record of any seditious libel case in a
colonial court after 1735).
282. Franklin first published the essay On Freedom of Speech after his brother James had
been imprisoned for publishing something that offended the Massachusetts Legislature. LEVY,
supra note 240, at 113, 119.
283. SMITH, supra note 270, at 25 (“Cato’s Letters were published and republished for
decades in Britain and were immensely popular in America, where journalists and political
theorists praised and imitated the authors.”).
284. CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 141 (1953) (“No one can spend any
time in the newspapers, library inventories, and pamphlets of colonial America without realizing
that Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government was the most popular, quotable,
esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period.”).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 229–231.
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Jeffrey Smith points out that in fact there was a “lucid and
dynamic” free press ideology at the time of the First Amendment’s
ratification.286 This ideology developed from a combination of radical
Whig philosophy emphasizing the connection between public
knowledge and political freedom, and broader liberal and
Enlightenment political philosophies, which rejected the divine right
of kings, emphasized reason over orthodoxy, and put faith in the
individual as an autonomous political actor.287
The contention that the Framers had no intention of eliminating
the law of seditious libel has more support, and it was one of the
288
It is
conclusions from Legacy that Levy defended in Emergence.
true that the writers of the Revolutionary period, even the most
libertarian—“Cato,” Tunis Wortman, even Thomas Jefferson—would
often temper their free-press advocacy with a caveat suggesting some
limit to the freedom.289
The Pennsylvania Constitution is
representative in that it protects people’s ability to “freely speak,
write or print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty.”290 But these caveats are merely acknowledgements that
freedom of the press is not absolute, something nearly every writer,
291
judge, scholar, and critic has conceded over the past two centuries.
Also, during Senate debate over the language of the First
Amendment, a motion was made to qualify Madison’s phrasing to
include a provision saying press freedom should be protected “in as
ample a manner as hath at any time been secured by the common
law.”292 This motion’s failure is evidence that the First Amendment
was not designed merely to codify the common law.293
286.
287.
288.
289.

SMITH, supra note 270, at vii–viii.
Id. at 42–53.
LEVY, supra note 240, at xii.
See 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 98 (ALBERT ELLERY BERGH &
ANDREW A. LIBSCOMB eds., 1907) (“A declaration that the Federal Government will never
restrain the presses from printing anything they please will not take away the liability of the
printers for false facts printed.”).
290. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
291. Although some have taken the view that the First Amendment provides an absolute
shield against government interference with speech, see, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Absolutism:
Unadorned and Without Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351 (1992), few, if any, have suggested that
“speech” be defined so broadly as to fully immunize every expressive act or utterance, including
the shouting of “fire” in a crowded theatre, to use Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s familiar
example. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
292. Anderson, supra note 38, at 480 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
SENATE 70 (1789)).
293. Smith adds that there was widespread opposition to the crime of seditious libel prior to
the First Amendment’s ratification, and that although most writers agreed that people should
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Some suggest that the clearest evidence of the Framers’ narrow
conception of press freedom was the passage of the Sedition Act in
1798.294 Why would the Federalists, many of whom participated
directly in the framing, passage, or ratification of the First
Amendment, be so indifferent to free-press interests in 1798 if they
had an expansive notion of press freedom in 1791? The answer is
simple. If the Framers all agreed upon one thing, it was that power is
inevitably abused—particularly where concentrated or unchecked.295
It is a natural and inescapable human tendency that the
Constitution—with its focus on limited government, enumerated
powers, and checks and balances—and the Bill of Rights—with its
focus on preserving individual autonomy against government
intrusion—were designed to guard against. That the Federalists
sought to usurp these constitutional protections after ratification of
the Bill of Rights simply confirms what the Framers—both
Republicans and Federalists—understood and anticipated prior to the
ratification. As James Madison opined in Federalist 51, men are not
angels; if they were, “neither external nor internal controls . . . would
be necessary,” and indeed, neither would government.296 Thomas
Jefferson subsequently exonerated all those who were prosecuted
under the Sedition Act, and Congress later repaid the fines,297 which
suggests that the law was more likely an anomalous political
overreach than an expression of broad indifference to First
Amendment interests.
In assessing the Framers’ intent, the focus should be on what they
said and wrote before the Constitution was adopted—before their
judgments were clouded by politics and practicalities; before they had

have legal recourse to defend their personal reputations, the proper remedy was a civil suit for
damages. See Smith, supra note 263, at 74–77.
294. See supra note 250. The Sedition Act made it a crime—punishable by a fine of up to
$2,000 and a prison sentence of up to two years—to publish any “false, scandalous and malicious
writing or writings against the government of the United States . . . with intent to defame the
said government . . . .” JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS 441–42 (1956). There
were fourteen prosecutions under the Act, all targeting the Republican or opposition press and
ten convictions. After Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency, he and Congress allowed the
law to expire, and Jefferson pardoned those in jail and exonerated those awaiting trial. EMERY
ET AL., supra note 281, at 72.
295. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521, 528 (1977) (noting that the Framers saw the First Amendment as
essential in “checking the inherent tendency of government officials to abuse the power
entrusted to them”).
296. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
297. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
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emerged from what John Rawls describes as the “original position.”298
It is in that position, in which the Framers did not know whether they
would be the wielders or the subjects of the powers they were
creating, that their natural inclination toward self-aggrandizement
yielded to more extrinsic interests.
Although Levy and other critics have provided a healthy antidote
to the most idealized characterizations of original intent, they
overstate their case. It is clear that the Framers believed strongly in
individual autonomy; they believed the press should play an
important watchdog role; and they believed the press should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open, although certainly not completely
unrestrained or beyond the reach of the law.
How the Framers felt about the right to gather news is more
difficult to gauge, because newsgathering practices had not yet
evolved into the sophisticated set of techniques and standards that are
familiar today. If newsgathering was defined broadly as the search for
and acquisition of newsworthy information for the purpose of
communicating it to others, then newsgathering is, in fact, as old as
human civilization. Even if that definition is too broad, one must
concede that newsgathering has been conducted in America for as
long as there have been news media, and certainly well before
ratification of the First Amendment.
In 1690, in the first edition of the first newspaper ever published in
the American colonies, printer Benjamin Harris made a bold
statement to his readers about his newsgathering practices. Harris
wrote that his new publication, Publick Occurrences Both Forreign
and Domestick (“Publick Occurrences”), would not merely serve as a
vehicle for his personal reflections on the world but would seek to
apprise people of all newsworthy information, relying on only the best
sources.299 He promised readers that “[this publisher] will take what
pains he can to obtain a Faithful Relation of all such things; and will
particularly make himself beholden to such Persons in Boston whom
he knows to have been for their own use the diligent Observers of
300
such matters.” He added later that he would only publish what he
knew to be true, “repairing to the best fountains for Information.”301

298.
299.
300.
301.

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971).
JAMES MELVIN LEE, HISTORY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 10 (1923).
Id.
Id.
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The royal governor banned Publick Occurrences after its first issue,302
and it would be fourteen years before the appearance of the next
colonial paper, Boston’s News-Letter, in 1704.303 John Campbell
published the News-Letter, relying on the part-time services of several
correspondents in New York, Newport, Portsmouth, Philadelphia, and
Salem to supply the paper with much of its news.304 The paper’s
contents were often prosaic (arrival dates of ships, accidents, court
305
actions, storm reports), but Campbell did rely on sources, just as
Harris had promised to do. In several instances, the paper provided
306
detailed coverage of more newsworthy events. In at least a limited
sense, then, Harris and Campbell, the colonies’ first newspaper
publishers, were also its first newsgatherers.
Colonial printers and publishers relied on sources in a manner
similar to how modern reporters do, although perhaps less formally
and less frequently. In addition to at least occasionally consulting
with sources, most colonial papers had relationships with contributors
who wrote essays pseudonymously. This was a common practice in
the early papers and continued throughout the eighteenth and much
of the nineteenth centuries.307 The most famous political tracts of the
colonial period, the radical Whig essays of Gordon and Trenchard,
were published under the pseudonym “Cato.”308
During the
309
Revolutionary period, anonymous essays abounded in the press.
Thomas Paine’s famous tract attacking slavery was published in the
Philadelphia Journal under the name “Humanus.”310 Paine’s Common
Sense was also published pseudonymously, and in fact was later
attacked by College of Philadelphia Provost William Smith under the

302. Id. at 9.
303. Id. at 17, 19.
304. FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM 50 (1962). Note, however, that these
were not correspondents in the contemporary sense. They were not paid or identified in print,
and their reports were sporadic. They were primarily postmasters from other cities. Other
early papers also relied on correspondents, including the Boston Gazette and the Pennsylvania
Gazette. Id.
305. LEE, supra note 299, at 12.
306. Campbell, for example, provided detailed, first-hand accounts of the hanging of six
pirates in 1704, which were published in a special edition of the paper. Id. at 24.
307. See HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 67 (1989) (noting that reporters rarely identified their sources, “even as late as the
1890s”).
308. See supra text accompanying note 278.
309. See generally LEVY, supra note 240 (discussing several authors who submitted writings
using a pseudonym).
310. See MOTT, supra note 304, at 91 & n.36.
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name “Cato.”311 Paine rebutted Smith in the Pennsylvania Packet as
“The Forester.”312 John Adams, John Dickenson, and Samuel Adams
all published anonymous essays that were instrumental in the
313
Even the great essays of Madison,
Revolutionary campaign.
Hamilton, and Jay, which urged ratification of the newly minted
Constitution and ultimately became known as the Federalist Papers,
were first published in the New York Independent Journal, and later
scores of other papers, under the pseudonym “Publius.”314 These
essays provide a handful of examples of a practice that was a defining
315
feature of American journalism and one that remains so today.
Printers’ relationships with anonymous contributors were similar
to today’s confidential reporter–source relationships in that the
printers usually understood that the contributors’ identities were to
be kept confidential, though in many cases the identities of the
anonymous authors were widely known or could be deduced from
316
their writings. But in some instances in which the author’s identity
was unknown, the targets of printed criticisms sought to discover the
author’s identity.317 Importantly, many of those demands were
318
In 1765, during the controversy over the
challenged or ignored.
Stamp Act, a person or group signing as “Freedom” submitted a letter
to the clerk of the House in New York that accused its members of
not supporting “public Liberty.”319 The Assembly then requested that
the governor offer a reward of fifty pounds to anyone who would
reveal the identities of the authors of the “Libellous, Scandalous, and

311. Id. at 91.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 89.
314. Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at viii (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
315. Most contemporary publications include bylines on works submitted by others (letters
to the editor, columns, Op/Ed pieces), which is unlike the practice in the Revolutionary era.
But the news is still replete with information and quotations from unidentified sources, and
much of the material on blogs is published anonymously or without precise attribution.
316. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 206 (citing ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1776–1790 (1942)).
317. See id. at 62–83.
318. Dwight L. Teeter, for example, notes that “[t]he pennames of the men who wrote for
the newspapers concealed some of Pennsylvania’s—and America’s—most renowned
politicians” and that “[p]olitical power helped to shield the printers from punishment.” Dwight
L. Teeter, Press Freedom and the Public Printing: Pennsylvania 1775–83, 45 JOURNALISM Q.
445, 448–49 (1968).
319. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 64.
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Seditious” letter.320 This was a substantial reward, but no one
responded.321
In 1769, after the Governor offered a 150-pound reward for the
identity of the author of two handbills that attacked the New York
Assembly, a journeyman printer in the shop that produced the
handbills came forward to claim the money and identified the
322
printer’s owner, James Parker, as publisher of the handbills. Parker
was questioned, and though he initially balked at having to identify
the handbills’ author, he ultimately relented after interrogation and
threats of imprisonment and the loss of his job as comptroller of the
post office.323 Parker identified the author as Alexander McDougall,
who was subsequently tried for seditious libel.324
Even more revealing are the actions of New-Jersey Gazette editor
Isaac Collins, who published an anonymous essay in 1779 satirizing
Governor William Livingston.325 The governor’s Council demanded
326
that Collins reveal the author’s name, but he refused. As Leonard
Levy explains, Collins then wrote a letter to the Council explaining his
decision and pointing out that “if he gave up the name of the author
without his permission, he would not only be betraying a trust; he
would ‘be far from acting as a faithful guardian of the press.’”327 The
Council voted seventeen-to-eleven against taking further action
328
Five years later, Livingston himself wrote an
against Collins.
anonymous essay in the Gazette under the name “Scipio,” and after
Collins was again pressured to reveal the author’s identity, Livingston,
using the same penname, responded with a series of articles defending
anonymous writings and their importance to press freedom.329
These few anecdotes do not provide conclusive evidence of a
pervasive appreciation for newsgathering or the sanctity of reporter–
source relationships. But they do help dispel the notion that prior to
the First Amendment, printers had no such conceptions. Scholars like
Don Pember are probably correct when they say “[n]ews-gathering,

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 189–90.
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reporting, access to government information as we speak of it today
was not really an important part of the American press of that era.”330
But it is just as misleading to suggest that printers during this period
did not gather news, did not have relationships with sources, and did
not appreciate source confidentiality.
With respect to history and the Framers’ intent, a few points seem
clear. First, the Framers and their contemporaries understood that
the press plays a vital role in checking government abuses and in
331
providing a forum for individual expression. There is no evidence,
however, that they saw the press—that is, the institutional class of
printers—as requiring special rights that other individuals or groups
did not possess. It was not the unique skill, identity, or character of
printers that the Framers sought to protect; it was the function they
served and the vehicle they provided for individuals’ expression that
warranted protection. This view augers for the kind of egalitarian
conception of the press described earlier—one that emphasizes
conduct over credentials and that encompasses bloggers and others
whose practices parallel those of the printers and pamphleteers of the
Revolutionary era. 332 Second, printers during this period did engage
in newsgathering activity and did consult with sources.333 Moreover,
they respected the special nature of their relationship with sources
and in some instances refused to divulge the names of their
anonymous contributors in the face of considerable government
pressure.334 Protections like the reporter’s privilege, then, have a
substantial historical foundation that should not be overlooked.
Third, the Framers almost certainly did not anticipate the First
Amendment being used as a vehicle for access to government records
or proceedings. Other than the criminal courts, which had been open
to the public for centuries in both the colonies and England, the
Framers’ experience with open government was almost non-existent,
and there is certainly no evidence that they viewed access as a
constitutional requirement.335 The arguments to the contrary are

330. Don R. Pember, Founders (Meeting in Secret) Protected Our Right to Publish, but Not
to Gather the News, BULL. AM. SOC’Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec. 1978–Jan. 1979, at 6.
331. See generally Blasi, supra note 295.
332. See supra Part I.B.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 299–315.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 316–329.
335. Neither the proceedings of the Continental Congress nor the Constitutional
Convention were open to the public, the U.S. Senate did not open its doors until 1794, and
according to historian Harold Nelson, the colonial legislatures only admitted the public when
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usually built around a set of indefinite statements from Madison and
others336 that, although clearly supporting access as a kind of civic
virtue, did not suggest that it is constitutionally mandated.337
All of these conclusions are based on an analysis of text and
intent. But further clarity can be sought by reading the First
Amendment and interpreting the historical record in light of the
Constitution’s broader structure and rhetorical framing.
C. Newsgathering and Structure
In applying the sequential approach to the First Amendment, it is
necessary to step back from these sources and consider whether the
rights sought flow naturally from the general tenor of the
Constitution. Rights not explicitly stated in the Constitution may
nevertheless be recognized where they are consistent with the
constitutional grammar that shapes the entire document. In this
context, the question is whether a right to gather news is compatible
with the framework of rights outlined in the Constitution.
In assessing the meaning of the Speech and Press Clauses of the
First Amendment, several structural characteristics of the broader
document must be considered. One is that the Constitution was
plainly composed to preserve negative freedom—that is, freedom
338
from government. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights do not

“the revolutionaries could make propaganda out of [it].” Harold L. Nelson, Separating the
Inseparable? Linking News-Gathering with Publishing Called “Dubious,” BULL. AM. SOC’Y
NEWSPAPER EDITORS, Dec. 1978–Jan. 1979, at 7.
336. See, e.g., Dyk, supra note 38, at 959 (suggesting that the Framers recognized the
importance of access). Dyk quotes Cato’s essay on “Freedom of Speech,” which states, “[I]t is
in the Interest, and ought to be the Ambition, of all honest magistrates, to have their Deeds
openly examined, and publickly [sic] screened . . . .” Id. He also quotes James Madison, who
wrote that to “‘freely examine public characters and measures, and of free communication
thereon’ was ‘the only effectual guardian of every other right.’” Id. Both of these statements
can be read, however, as seeking only a right to openly criticize and hold accountable through
expression, not as a right of access to monitor officials’ daily activities.
337. Nelson, supra note 335, at 7.
338. The main body of the Constitution, for example, carefully delimits the powers of the
various branches and only allows government officials to exercise the authority specifically
granted to them. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (identifying the so-called enumerated powers
of Congress). In addition, the Bill of Rights provisions are presented as a list of prohibitions—
things the government may not do—as opposed to a list of actions it must take or obligations it
must fulfill on behalf of the people. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no
law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . .”);
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to
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compel the government to guarantee specific things to individuals
(e.g., property, health care, employment, education) nor to protect
private parties from each other.339 The founding documents identify
the government’s powers, with an emphasis on the limits of those
powers, and impose a set of restraints on government authority to
intrude into the lives of sovereign people. None of the rights in the
Bill of Rights can be properly characterized as affirmative,
particularly the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law”).340
Thus, in interpreting the First Amendment, the arguments for rights of
access to government records or proceedings are invariably strained,
in part because they require the application of an interpretive
template that recasts the First Amendment in ways that are
inconsistent with both the language of the Amendment and the
language used throughout the Constitution. The Constitution’s
negative construction suggests only that the government must not
interfere with individuals’ expressive freedom, not that it must
affirmatively assist their acquisition of knowledge or facilitate access
to communications media.341 And proposals for rights of access to the
media, even if they find support from some theory of free expression,
would require an abandonment of this key structural characteristic of
the Constitution.342 Legitimate bases remain upon which to recognize
343
constitutional rights of access, but they find no support from a
structural analysis of the Constitution.
Another structural characteristic of the Constitution is that it is
fundamentally an expression of support for individual autonomy.
Clearly, the First Amendment prohibits most direct restraints on
individual expression, but the tenor and shape of the Constitution
also suggest that government actions that interfere with individual or
institutional autonomy—particularly those which intimidate speakers
or otherwise inhibit expressive or investigative acts—ought to be

answer . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted.”).
339. The Constitution only addresses the powers of the federal government and the
limitations on those powers.
340. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
341. Similarly, the fact that the government is prohibited from forcing a citizen to surrender
his arms or to quarter troops in his home does not mean it is obligated to supply him with
weapons and a home in the first place. Nor does the First Amendment’s prohibition of
government suppression of religious expression compel the government to facilitate that activity
by constructing places of worship.
342. For more on the negative rights construction, see supra Part I.C.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 170–173.
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sharply scrutinized.344 For this reason, the Court should have treated
differently the protections sought by the media litigants in Branzburg,
Zurcher, Herbert, and Cohen. For example, in Branzburg and other
reporter’s privilege cases decided by the lower courts, the privilege is
often framed as little more than a demand by journalists to be
excused from the normal obligations of citizenship.345
When
presented that way, the conclusion is simple: Journalists are not above
the law and are not entitled to any extraordinary protections.
Yet the reporter’s privilege is really about government
interference with the private, confidential relationships between
journalists and their sources. The privilege should therefore be
conceived of as a negative right, shielding journalists (defined
broadly) from government encroachments. The same analysis should
be applied in cases involving newsroom searches, inquiries into
journalist’s editorial processes, and journalists’ decisions about the
346
violability of their own agreements with sources. But it is clear that
the courts deciding these cases have overlooked or minimized the
autonomy principle and how destructive these government intrusions
can be to the independence and intrepidity of journalists.
A third key structural characteristic of the Constitution is its
emphasis on equality.
None of the rights protected in the
Constitution and Bill of Rights is conferred only on a particular class
of citizens. Constitutional rights can be invoked by any citizen,
provided the citizen is engaged in the underlying behavior that the
347
Thus, any claim that the First
right was designed to protect.
Amendment supports recognition of special rights available only to
the “institution of the press,” as Justice Stewart suggested, is
contradicted by this equality principle.348 Such a claim is also
344. The negative rights framing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, and the latter’s clear
emphasis on individual autonomy from the state suggests that a broader zone of freedom from
the government ought to be recognized—one that does more than merely prohibit direct
suppression of speech. There are indirect actions that government can take that produce the
same pernicious effects. See supra note 77.
345. 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972) (“The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to
respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do.”). See also McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d
530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (“We do not see why there need to be special criteria merely because
the possessor of the documents . . . is a journalist.”).
346. See infra Part IV.A.
347. In the case of the First Amendment, this means that the citizen was gathering
information of public interest for the purpose of communicating to an audience.
348. Justice Stewart might have challenged this seeming contradiction by pointing to the fact
that the institution of “the press” was clearly identified in the text of the First Amendment.
Thus, those rights can safely be awarded only to certain groups, much like, for example, Sixth
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incompatible with the explicit language of the Constitution’s
Preamble, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
349
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This ethos of equality reinforces the adoption of egalitarian
definitions of “journalist” and “the press” that do not condition rights
on the status, credentials, experience, or professional standing of those
engaged in newsgathering and dissemination.
On the other hand, a structural analysis provides little support for
a right of access to government information or proceedings or of
other affirmative rights under the First Amendment. Similarly, there
is little support for the notion of special rights for the press, as Justice
350
Stewart urged, at least where the press is defined as a preferred
class based on attributes other than the function they are performing.
The structural analysis does however, support those who urge for
recognition of a reporter’s privilege and other protections that
preserve reporters’ investigative and expressive activity.
D. Newsgathering and Context
The preceding analysis suggests that there is substantial
constitutional support for recognizing a broader right to gather news
than the narrow right identified by the Supreme Court,351 and that this
conclusion is defensible even without considering the contextual
factors described next. The text, history, and structure of the First
Amendment and Constitution provide a sufficient foundation for
protecting journalists’ ability to preserve confidential source
relationships, repel newsroom searches and refuse to fully comply

Amendment rights were designed specifically to protect criminal defendants, and Third
Amendment rights were specifically designed to protect homeowners. But this interpretation is
built on the assumption that the Framers used the phrase “the press” to refer to a particular
institution or class of speakers and not merely to the medium or the phenomenon of “the
press.” The evidence, though not uniform, favors the latter interpretation.
349. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (“We hold these Truths to be self evident, that all Men are created
equal . . . .”).
350. See Stewart, supra note 38, at 636.
351. Despite its statement that “without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom
of the press could be eviscerated,” Branzbrug v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), the Court has
not recognized any protections for newsgathering, except the right of the press and the public to
attend certain judicial proceedings.
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with government inquiries into their editorial processes, among other
things. Still, there are some protections that find less support from
those sources but that might nevertheless be worthy of recognition,
because they are essential to the exercise of other rights, or because
they involve culturally embedded practices that are part of widely
held conceptions of individual liberty.
Undoubtedly, newsgathering activity is an accepted, culturally
embedded practice. Newsgathering is as old as the press itself, and it
cannot be prohibited entirely without destroying the “bulwark”
function of the press. Even though newsgathering had not fully
evolved by the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, it has
grown more sophisticated and is now an essential component of
contemporary notions of press freedom.
Reporters have relied on sources since the earliest days of
journalism, and independent observation of news events has been
practiced since at least the late 1600s.352 During the Civil War period,
these and other newsgathering techniques became more
standardized.353 Unlike many of their predecessors, Civil War
reporters relied on eyewitnesses, conducted interviews, and built their
354
stories around multiple sources. In addition, Hazel Dicken-Garcia
notes that “[r]eporters also cultivated high-ranking officials to
355
maintain good relations and keep access to sources open.”
Reporters during this period also took seriously their obligations
356
In
to their sources and took pains to protect sources’ identities.
1851, John Nugent of the New York Herald became the first reporter
to claim a privilege when he was jailed for contempt of Congress after
refusing to identify the source who leaked to him a secret draft of a
357
Maryland became the first state to pass a shield
proposed treaty.
law to protect journalists’ confidentiality agreements in 1896.358 In

352. See supra text accompanying notes 295–311.
353. See DICKEN-GARCIA, supra note 307, at 51.
354. See id. at 53–55.
355. Id. at 55.
356. Dicken-Garcia notes that reporters did not identify their sources in their stories
throughout most of the nineteenth century and that reporters’ bylines rarely appeared until the
Civil War period and that this omission was part of “journalists’ ‘protected’ status.” See id. at
67–68.
357. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 515, 533 (2007).
358. See Bruce Bortz & Laura Bortz, ‘Pressing’ Out the Wrinkles in Maryland’s Shield Law
for Journalists, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 461, 462 n.10 (1979).
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this sense, most of the core professional practices today are not
modern-day creations, but have been practiced for hundreds of years.
There is also a long tradition of investigative journalism in the
359
United States. Hazel Dicken-Garcia points out that during the Civil
War, Northern reporters used disguises to avoid being detected while
working in the South.360 This subterfuge provided an early model for
the investigative reporters who proliferated at the end of the
361
In 1880, Henry Demarest Lloyd published a series of
century.
magazine articles exposing corruption in business and politics.362
Other “muckrakers” emerged in the early part of the twentieth
century: Lincoln Steffens, who found evidence of widespread graft in
America’s cities;363 Ida Tarbell, who revealed the abuses of Standard
364
Oil Company; and Upton Sinclair, whose investigations brought
attention to unsanitary meat-packing practices in Chicago.365 Other
reporters followed their lead and over the course of the twentieth
century investigative reporting became one of the principal
components of mainstream American journalism.
In some cases, these investigations involved undercover reporting
and other deceptive practices. In 1887, Nelly Bly (Elizabeth
Cocheran) feigned insanity to expose inhumane conditions at
366
Blackwell’s Island Asylum. Eighty-five years later, a young WABC
reporter named Geraldo Rivera entered the grounds of a similar
facility, the Willowbrook State School, to expose the poor treatment

359. See James Aucoin, Investigative Journalism, in AMERICAN JOURNALISM: HISTORY,
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES 210 (W. David Sloan & Lisa Mullikin Parcell eds.) (2002) (“Although
‘investigative journalism’—as practiced by professional journalists today—began in about the
1920s, there has been an investigative spirit burning in American journalism ever since the
colonial period.”).
360. See DICKEN-GARCIA, supra note 307, at 55.
361. Id.
362. These articles were The Story of a Great Monopoly and The Political Economy of
Seventy-Three Million Dollars, published in 1881 and 1882 respectively, in the Atlantic Monthly,
and Making Bread Dear and Lords of Industry, published in 1883 and 1884 respectively, in the
North American Review. Some consider Lloyd to be America’s first investigative journalist.
363. See generally LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE CITIES (1904). This book is
based on Steffens’ articles originally published in McClure’s.
364. See generally IDA TARBELL, HISTORY OF STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904). This
book is based on Tarbell’s articles originally published in McClure’s.
365. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1905).
366. Bly wrote a series of articles that first appeared in the New York World on Oct. 9, 1887.
Bly’s series was later published in book form as Nellie Bly’s Ten Days in a Mad-House. See
generally BROOKE KROEGER, NELLY BLY: DAREDEVIL, REPORTER, FEMINIST 85–89 (1994).
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of its mentally disabled patients.367 Scores of other undercover
techniques, including hidden cameras and microphones, have become
commonplace over the past century, whether their use is in all
368
contexts legal or ethical.
How is all of this relevant to the
constitutionality of restrictions of newsgathering activity? To the
extent that the previous analyses of text, history, and structure provide
a sufficient basis for recognizing newsgathering protections, these
contextual considerations are unnecessary, although they certainly
reinforce the earlier conclusions. If, however, the text, history, and
structure are inadequate, then some attempt should be made to
evaluate the current cultural context and the public’s expectations.
It would clearly be unconstitutional, for example, for Congress to
pass a law prohibiting people from conducting interviews (at least for
the purpose of disseminating the information to others). Whether or
not the text, history, or structure of the Constitution would prohibit
such a law, the law would punish activity that is essential to the full
exercise of the right to freedom of the press and it would forbid a
practice that is “basic in our scheme of [First Amendment] values.”369
The ability of journalists, and all citizens, to interact with others and to
acquire new information and ideas is an elemental prerequisite for
the meaningful exercise of expressive freedom. That ability should be
protected even though the act of interviewing someone is not, by
itself, expressive. The same argument could be made to challenge
laws prohibiting undercover reporting.
Undercover reporting
techniques are part of contemporary conceptions of freedom of the
press and involve the kinds of antecedent acts that are critical to
journalists’ ability to provide useful oversight of government officials
and others who occupy powerful positions. That is not to say that the
contemporary context requires recognition of broader immunities for
journalists who break the law or commit tortious acts while gathering
news.370 But, for example, certainly any attempt to prohibit journalists

367. See generally GERALDO RIVERA, WILLOWBROOK: A REPORT ON HOW IT IS AND WHY
IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE THAT WAY (1972).
368. See generally Brief for Investigative Reporters and Editors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Food Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 97-2492, 97-2564 (4th Cir. Apr. 19,
1998), at 20–23, available at http://www.ire.org/obsolete/publications/IREBRIEF.PDF
(describing dozens of instances where reporters have used undercover methods to expose
information of vital public importance).
369. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
370. However, as indicated earlier, some kind of qualified protection ought to be recognized
because of the high risk of abuse by prosecutors and plaintiffs in these kinds of cases.
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from concealing their identities from others would be
unconstitutional, at least where the non-disclosure is not fraudulent.
These contextual arguments are more difficult to make when used
to support protections for the use of hidden cameras or high-powered
microphones. These techniques are not part of a centuries-old
tradition, although they are arguably modern applications of older
methods. One might agree that there is a culturally embedded
expectation that journalists will be afforded a certain amount of
autonomy from government, but not that they will be excused from
their duties as citizens to respond to valid subpoenas. The reporter’s
privilege is a contested idea that has not been uniformly embraced by
371
either courts or legislatures. Still, a social consensus should not be
necessary for recognizing a constitutional right. And in light of
journalists’ long history of relying on confidential sources—one that
predates the First Amendment’s ratification—the public probably
does appreciate the special nature of reporter–source relationships
and recognizes the risks posed by excessive government
encroachments.
This contextual analysis is more pertinent with respect to claims
for affirmative rights—particularly rights of access to places and
records. Even though the text, history, and structure of the First
Amendment and the Constitution evidence a negative-rights
framework,372 a compelling case can be made that access rights are
culturally embedded and that a living constitution must account for
matters of profound societal expectation, such as the ability to witness
what occurs in the criminal courts.373 That ability, which the Court
recognized as First Amendment right in Richmond Newspapers, could
be characterized as culturally embedded because America’s criminal
courts have always been open.374 Still, any attempt to place this right
within the ambit of the First Amendment is problematic because it
necessitates an affirmative construction.
A better approach
recognizes a right of access to the courts, not as part of an affirmative
right to know, but as a necessary condition for the proper

371. See supra text accompanying notes 41–51.
372. See supra Part I.C.
373. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (“People in an open
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept
what they are prohibited from observing.”).
374. The same is not true—at least not to the same extent—with access to records or to
places other than the courts.
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enforcement of rights protected by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Amendments.375
IV. RESHAPING NEWSGATHERING LAW
In order to resolve some of the incongruities in the courts’
treatment of specific newsgathering problems, courts should begin by
revisiting the three key issues addressed in Part I. First, courts must
reject Justice Stewart’s proposition that the Speech and Press Clauses
be read to provide distinct sets of rights based on communicators’
376
expertise, credentials, or institutional affiliations. Courts must also
cease to recognize special rights for the press—at least where “the
press” is defined using expert-model criteria. The Supreme Court in
particular must explicitly disavow its statements differentiating the
legal claims of media and non-media parties in its string of libel cases
in the 1980s and 1990s.377 Although there is some conflicting evidence
on the Framers’ intent regarding the Speech and Press Clauses, the
best evidence suggests that they merely sought to distinguish the
different means by which messages could be communicated, not to
carve out a distinct constitutional status for the established printers.378
The Framers clearly understood the unique capacity of the press to
serve as a “bulwark of liberty,” driving public discourse and
monitoring and exposing abuses by those in power.379 But because
licensing of the press ceased long before the Revolution,380 and
because there were no de jure barriers to any person’s use of that
381
medium, it is implausible that if the Framers were alive today they

375. A more appropriate application of a contextual analysis (although still a challenging
one) would be if, for example, Congress passed a law closing public and press access to the
galleries in the House and Senate chambers. This is a situation where there is no alternative
constitutional hook like there is with access to the courts. So, one would be forced to rely on
the First Amendment and to propose an affirmative-rights construction, suggesting that because
journalists have been provided access to House debates since the first Congress and because the
Senate has been open since 1794, closing those chambers would thwart a critical societal
expectation involving the processes by which citizens are governed.
376. Stewart, supra note 38.
377. See supra text accompanying notes 71–74.
378. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (dismissing
the notion of a separate meaning for the Press Clause and arguing that the press merited
separate mention by the framers merely because “it had been more often the object of official
restraints”).
379. See Blasi, supra note 295, at 528.
380. See LEVY, supra note 240, at 36–37.
381. Anyone wanting to publish needed to have access to a printing press. But this was an
obstacle more readily overcome than a legal prohibition or a system of licensing.
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would reserve “press” rights for the mainstream news media to the
exclusion of freelancers, bloggers, or “lonely pamphleteers.” Many
eighteenth century publications were, after all, functionally equivalent
to the burgeoning micro-media of today.
Second, the courts must close the door on affirmative rights or
find a sturdier basis for recognizing them. Because the structure of
the First Amendment and the Bill or Rights compels a negative
construction, affirmative rights of access should not be recognized
where they are built around a vague and boundless “right-to-know”
382
rationale. Whatever edifying benefits the right of access provides,
one cannot, as the Supreme Court has said, “confuse what is ‘good,’
‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ with what is constitutionally commanded by
the First Amendment. To do so is to trivialize constitutional
adjudication.”383 Nevertheless, there are other constitutional hooks
for recognizing some of these rights.384 Contextual arguments can also
be applied to support some access claims—suggesting, for example,
that a right of access to criminal courts is a culturally embedded
expectation—but this requires a more nuanced interpretation, and
one that is unnecessary given other bases for protection.
Third, the courts must fashion a definition of “journalist” based
upon the egalitarian and functional criteria described earlier—criteria
385
that the Supreme Court has embraced in dicta and that some other
386
courts have fleshed out more explicitly. Other approaches cannot
be squared with the ethos of equality that pervades the Constitution,
nor can they be reconciled with the overwhelming evidence that the
Framers of the Constitution recognized and sought to safeguard the
freedom of all citizens to serve—through both speech and press—as
bulwarks of liberty. The definitional question will not be an urgent

382. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986) (“[O]penness in criminal trials, including the selection of jurors, ‘enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in
the system.’”).
383. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
384. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
385. Branzbrug v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972).
386. See, e.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 1987) (“We hold that an
individual claiming the journalist’s privilege must demonstrate, through competent evidence,
the intent to use material sought to disseminate information to the public and that such intent
existed at the inception of the newsgathering process.”). The Court in von Bulow emphasized
that those claiming the privilege need not be members of the “institutionalized press” as long as
they are “involved in activities traditionally associated with gathering and disseminating news.”
Id. at 142.
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one for the Supreme Court until it revisits Branzburg; however, given
the frequency with which reporters and courts clash over source
confidentiality387 and the doctrinal discord among the federal
388
circuits, an eventual reassessment seems inevitable.
Making these changes will help resolve a number of the
uncertainties and imperfections in the three key areas of
newsgathering law: autonomy, liability, and access.
A. Autonomy
In nearly all of the Supreme Court’s newsgathering cases, the
Court has rejected the media litigant’s claims, largely because the
Court construed them as somehow pitting the rights of journalists
389
The Court was correct to
against those of the broader public.
eschew special rights, but it miscast the media litigants’ claims in
390
Cohen, Zurcher, Branzburg, and Herbert, among others, treating
them as pleas for special protections instead of attempts to claim
391
Because the Court
rights available to anyone who gathers news.
characterized the press as a discrete class of citizens,392 instead of as a
role that any citizen can play, it created an obstacle around which it
was then forced to navigate. Had the Court conceived of “the press”
in more egalitarian terms, there would have been no special-rights
problem. Certainly, those protections would only be meaningful to
those engaged in newsgathering activity, but that does not mean the
protections would be special rights for which some citizens would be
ineligible. No one would say, for example, that the Third Amendment
is a special right because its protections are only useful to
homeowners,393 or that the Sixth Amendment is a special right because
it is only applicable to those charged with federal crimes.394 These
rights, like those under the First Amendment, are available to all, even
if only some will ever need to invoke them.
387. See supra pp. 1–6.
388. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–88.
390. In the prison access cases, for example, the Court reached the correct conclusions, but
nevertheless mischaracterized the claims of the litigants as demands for exceptional treatment.
See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
391. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–88.
392. See supra note 123.
393. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . .”).
394. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
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In addition to unnecessarily complicating the special rights
problem, the Court’s newsgathering decisions have also undervalued
the principle of autonomy. Its decisions form around a simple
dichotomy in which expressive activity is fully protected and can only
be limited in extraordinary circumstances, while newsgathering
activity is minimally protected and must often yield to other social
concerns.395 The justices understand that there is a connection
between newsgathering and expression,396 but they tend not to see
restraints on the former as imperiling the latter. The problem with
subpoenas, newsroom searches, and inquiries into journalists’ editorial
processes is not merely that these actions might jeopardize reporters’
relationships with sources, but that they could be used to harass,
intimidate, and ultimately inhibit reporters’ future newsgathering and
expression. They present a wholly different set of hazards than does,
for example, a denial of access to government records. The latter
forecloses one source of information; the former poses a risk that
reporters will not seek that information in the first place—from any
source—and that if they do, they will be reluctant to write about it. In
short, the separation between expression and newsgathering is much
narrower in the autonomy contexts (e.g., Branzburg, Zurcher,
Herbert) than in the access contexts (e.g., Richmond, Press
Enterprise). Restrictions on newsgathering are per se violations that
suppress the free pursuit and publication of news, while the
restrictions on access are more akin to denials of benefits or
privileges.
An interpretation of the First Amendment that fails to
acknowledge and account for the potentially coercive effects of
government usurpations of press autonomy cannot be sustained.
These protections need not be absolute. Newsgathering behavior is

395. The two-track model outlined by Justice Brennan in his famous Rutgers University
speech essentially summarizes the Court’s approach. Brennan, supra note 173, at 176 (“Under
one model—which I call the ‘speech’ model—the press requires and is accorded the absolute
protection of the First Amendment. In the other model—I call it the ‘structural’ model—the
press’ interests may conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on
occasion favors the competing claim.”). But unlike many of his brethren, Justice Brennan
appreciated the risks posed to the press’ autonomy and the inhibiting effect some seemingly
content-neutral restrictions might have. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), for example, he dissented in part to emphasize that while journalists
ought not be immune from inquiries from libel plaintiffs, some qualified protection is necessary
to minimize the risk of unnecessary or excessive intervention.
396. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”).
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still one step removed from pure expression, but the ethos of
autonomy that pervades the Constitution and the clear connection
between autonomy and expression requires at least qualified
397
protection for newsgathering.
B. Liability
With the possible exception of the reporter’s privilege, the area of
newsgathering law that has provoked the most debate in the past
decade has been the use of content-neutral laws to punish
newsgathering activity. This tactic gained steam after the Court held
in Cohen that journalists have no constitutional protection against
398
“the application of general laws.” This holding invited plaintiffs to
sue media organizations for fraud, trespass, and other torts based on
how the journalists gathered their information rather than on what
they broadcast or published.399 These cases have been controversial in
part because they raise the most basic question: Is newsgathering, by
itself, constitutionally protected? The Supreme Court appeared to
answer this question in Branzburg when it held that “news gathering
is not without its First Amendment protections”400 and that “without
some [First Amendment] protection for seeking out the news,
401
But the Court has
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”
never explained what it meant by these statements, nor has it actually
recognized any newsgathering-specific rights.

397. These protections could take many forms. The dissenting justices in many of these
cases have actually outlined proposals that strike an acceptable balance. In Branzburg, Justices
Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall suggested that before a reporter could be made to comply with
a subpoena, the government must: “(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the
newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2)
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information.” Id. at 743. This approach has been followed by several lower
courts and has served as the model for several state shield laws. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978), Justices Stewart and Marshall argued that a newsroom search should only
be permitted when the possessor of the information sought has refused to comply with a valid
subpoena. Id. at 547, 575–76 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153 (1979), Justice Brennan argued that before libel plaintiffs could inquire about
journalists’ editorial processes, they must first demonstrate that the underlying publication was
both false and defamatory. Id. at 181 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
398. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937)).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 96–114.
400. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
401. Id. at 681.
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Under the Court’s longstanding First Amendment doctrine,
general laws that do not target expression (i.e., content-neutral laws)
are nevertheless subject to heightened scrutiny where their
402
enforcement imposes incidental burdens on free expression.
In
O’Brien v. United States, the Court held that, to sustain such a law, the
government must show that it serves a substantial government
interest and that its impact on expression is no greater than
necessary.403 It is perplexing, then, that the Court in Cohen made no
mention of O’Brien.404 Promissory estoppel is a generally applicable
law, and it was applied in Cohen in a manner that punished two
newspapers’ decisions to publish information of clear public interest
(i.e., that an aide to a gubernatorial candidate was engaging in smear
405
Perhaps the Court saw
tactics to subvert a political opponent).
Cohen not as a case about expression, but about the enforceability of
pre-publication contractual agreements. But Cohen was about more
than pre-publication issues. Indeed, the lawsuit was triggered when
two newspapers published articles containing information that was
clearly newsworthy and relevant to the outcome of a political
campaign.406
The Court was wrong in Cohen, both in the outcome it reached
and in the way it framed the issue. But what about fraud and trespass
cases where the triggering act is unrelated to, or at least separable
from, publication? If one contends that newsgathering is not
constitutionally protected, then the answer is simple: The cases can be
adjudicated under the Food Lion framework that prohibits
publication-related damages but that applies no unusual scrutiny to
407
But can this approach be squared with the
the underlying tort.
Supreme Court’s declaration in Branzburg that newsgathering is
408
What the Court said in Branzburg
constitutionally protected?
402. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
403. See id. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.”).
404. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
405. Id. at 668–70.
406. In Cohen, the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune published stories
indicating that the plaintiff, a high-ranking campaign worker for a gubernatorial candidate, was
engaged in a campaign to anonymously impugn the character of the opposing candidate. Id. at
665.
407. See generally Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
408. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
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seems innocuous, if not self-evident, yet the courts have not given any
concrete meaning to that abstract sentiment. Looking only at the
outcomes of Supreme Court cases, it appears that newsgathering is
not constitutionally protected and that the Supreme Court’s
statements to the contrary in Branzburg were just platitudinous dicta.
But if a law were passed that prohibited people from conducting
interviews, or from taking photographs or shooting video in public
places, it seems unlikely that the Court would acquiesce. If it did, the
Court would have to disavow its statements regarding newsgathering
from Branzburg and declare that newsgathering is not protected.409 If
it rejected such restrictions, however, the Supreme Court and lower
courts would have to reconsider a whole line of cases, including Food
Lion, where general laws affecting newsgathering were given no
heightened scrutiny, except to the extent they directly impacted
expression.410
The evidence from the sequential analysis outlined in this Article
suggests that the Supreme Court’s Branzburg dicta was correct.
There are non-expressive acts that are essential to individual
autonomy, individual self-fulfillment, and individuals’ capacity to
serve as effective watchdogs. As the Supreme Court put it more than
seventy years ago, the government should not be permitted to disturb
the “the natural right of the members of an organized society, united
for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their
common interests.”411 This does not mean that government must
affirmatively aid those efforts, but the First Amendment circumscribes
its ability to interfere with them. And because that interference can
come in the form of either content-based or content-neutral laws, and
because it can target either expression or pure newsgathering, there
must be some opportunity to weigh the competing interests and to
test the sincerity of the government’s purposes. The Court’s
categorical framework set forth in Cohen leaves open too many
opportunities for abuse by hostile officials and clever plaintiffs.
The simplest solution is to apply the intermediate scrutiny test
from O’Brien both to cases in which neutral laws incidentally burden
expression—which the Court has always done, Cohen
notwithstanding—and to cases in which those laws incidentally
409. See id. (“News gathering is not without its First Amendment protections . . . .”). See
also supra text accompanying notes 41–47.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 92–106.
411. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936) (emphasis added).

04__UGLAND_FINAL.DOC

186

7/23/2008 9:34:02 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 3:113

burden newsgathering.412 Properly applying the O’Brien test in the
newsgathering context would permit plaintiffs who have been harmed
by a newsgatherer’s non-expressive behavior to recover damages, but
would respect the newsgatherer’s expressive interests both by
prohibiting publication-related damage awards and by ensuring that
de minimus tort violations are not used to harass newsgatherers or
elicit punitive damage awards from sympathetic juries.413
Intermediate scrutiny in these contexts would provide sufficient
protection, but only if applied properly. In making the initial
determination whether a law is content-based or content-neutral,
courts must examine both the government’s motivations and its
patterns of enforcement. Indeed, even the O’Brien court did not
acknowledge the strong evidence showing that the prohibition on
destroying draft cards was motivated by an intent to suppress dissent,
despite the fact that the Court had previously acknowledged the
414
So, while the test the Court relied upon in
relevance of motive.
O’Brien is useful, it must be applied in a more searching way than the
Court did in the O’Brien case itself. Otherwise, neutral language can
continue to be used to disguise press-punitive laws, and neutral laws
will be applied discriminatorily to suppress newsgathering and
expression.415
C. Access
Although the Supreme Court has been relatively consistent in
employing a negative-rights template in speech and press cases, its
access rulings have introduced anomalous arguments that find no
support in either the text or history of the First Amendment or in the
412. See Erwin Chemerinsky, supra note 117, at 1161 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny
be applied to tort claims affecting newsgathering).
413. Although the First Amendment should protect the newsgathering rights of
communicators as well as their expressive rights, a generally applicable law that only implicates
the former would often be acceptable under O’Brien. The newsgathering freedom described
above would therefore have limited reach. But where someone’s newsgathering interests and
their expressive interests are put in jeopardy, the law’s application would be more likely to fail
O’Brien. So, if a plaintiff only sought compensation for the actual harm caused by a reporter’s
trespass, for example, O’Brien would rarely stand in the way. But if any attempt were made to
punish the subsequent publication, either by the awarding of publication damages, or by
enforcement of a contrived tort claim, O’Brien would provide some protection.
414. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
415. Nathan Siegel, Law and the Media: Striking a Balance for the Future, 1999 ANN. SURV.
OF AM. L. 207, 214 (1999) (“If in reality these torts have to be stretched and bent so far just to
try to find some theory to use as a pretext to sue the media for what’s being reported, we are not
really dealing here with laws that would generally be applied to people other than journalists.”).
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structure of the broader Constitution. There are other constitutional
provisions that provide a sound basis for recognizing some access
rights, but the Court weakened its First Amendment architecture by
416
building its rulings in Richmond Newspapers, etc., around the
amorphous right-to-know/public-edification concept.417 In Globe
Newspapers, the Court wrote that “to the extent that the First
Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to
ensure that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmental
affairs’ is an informed one.”418 But this rationale provides no basis for
concluding that access to the judiciary is different from access to any
419
other government proceeding. Its reach is limitless.
Had the Court relied solely on the historical rationale, it could
have made a contextual argument suggesting that the right of access
to the courts is culturally embedded and an essential dimension of
individual liberty.
But that approach requires an affirmative
construction of the First Amendment, which, even if legitimate, is
nevertheless unnecessary, because the same result can be reached by
relying on other constitutional provisions. A better approach, and one
that permits a purely negative-rights construction of the First
Amendment, is to provide access to the judiciary as a matter of
procedural fairness, guaranteed to all citizens by the Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Amendments. Collectively, these provisions
should be read as providing all citizens—both criminal defendants
and civil litigants—with a constitutional guarantee that the judicial
process will function equitably. Although judges would retain some
discretion to close proceedings in rare circumstances, under this
416. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Press
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County (Press Enterprise II), 478
U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S.
501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
417. The Constitution does support a “right to know” with respect to citizens’ ability to
receive information, but not a right to demand information from the government. The latter is
an affirmative right. The former, however, is a negative right that prohibits government
interference in the exchange of information between autonomous individuals (or groups), which
is a principle the Court has correctly upheld. Cf. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305
(1965) (holding that law requiring post-masters to hold mail that the Secretary of the Treasury
determined to be communist propaganda until addressee affirmatively requested the mail’s
release was unconstitutional as against the First Amendment).
418. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–605.
419. It is true that citizens have an interest in knowing that the political and administrative
branches of government are also functioning equitably and in ways that serve the public
interest, but the judgments made by judges and juries are more permanent and less easily
remedied through the normal political processes than are those made by public officials in the
other branches.
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negative-rights construction citizens would be presumptively free to
witness all civil and criminal court proceedings, much as they are
today.420
CONCLUSION
The first decade of the twenty-first century has already been one
of the most catalytic periods in the history of American journalism.
The media marketplace is still dominated by the traditional goliaths,
but the mainstream media’s audiences and influence are dwindling
with the emergence of new media and new journalistic forms. These
changes are occurring in a political climate that illustrates the need
for vigilant oversight of government by journalists and citizens from
every social and ideological stratum. Unfortunately, the power of
public oversight is weakened by the disjointed legal framework that
continues to govern the right to gather news.
The courts need to restructure their jurisprudence regarding
newsgathering and the First Amendment in a way that coheres
around a set of core principles—e.g., negative constitutional
constructions, no special rights, egalitarian conceptions of “the
press”—and that flows from a sensible and consistent approach to
constitutional interpretation. The sequential approach proposed in
this Article is just one method (or cluster of methods), but its
application here should illustrate not only that stronger protections
for newsgathering are constitutionally supportable, but that doing so
does not require any interpretive contortions or the application of
exotic theories.
Throughout the past three decades the Court has responded to
media claims in ways that fail to adequately protect all citizens’
expressive and newsgathering rights. These decisions and approaches
have created confusion about the dimensions of the Court’s First
Amendment doctrine. The alternative approach proposed here builds

420. Technically, this right would not “belong” solely to the individuals seeking access or to
those involved in the litigation, which means that access is not a right that could be waived. The
litigants would not be free to decide for themselves what procedural safeguards are warranted,
because all citizens have a stake in the proper functioning of that process, and because there is a
danger that some criminal defendants could be coerced into waiving their rights. The proposal
supported here would not, therefore, revive the Court’s ruling in Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (explaining that access is an issue rooted in the Sixth
Amendment right to an open trial, and because that right belongs to criminal defendants, they
are free to waive it).
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off the strengths of the Court’s approach while righting its mistakes to
seek a more predictable and internally consistent legal framework
oriented around a particular approach to constitutional
interpretation.
Toward that end, this Article suggests that the Court begin
defining First Amendment rights in terms of expression and
newsgathering, rather than speech and press; that it abandon any
suggestion that “freedom of the press” implies anything other than
the freedom of all citizens to seek out the news and to communicate it
through media; that it reverse its ruling in Cohen and dispose of the
“generally applicable laws” straight-jacket it imposed on lower courts;
that it find a different constitutional basis for recognizing rights of
access to the judiciary; that it reverse Branzburg, Herbert, and
Zurcher and the other autonomy cases and recognize that some
qualified privileges are necessary in these contexts to prevent the
chilling of expression and newsgathering. Finally, in employing these
constitutional protections, the Court should adopt a definition of the
press that is focused on the functions being performed rather than the
identity or characteristics of those performing them. As Chief Justice
Burger wrote: “The First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any
definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who
exercise its freedoms.”421

421. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

